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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH
TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH,
ST,\TE OF UTAH,

Plait1tiff-Appellant,

-\'S.-

SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC.,
GRAND CENTRAL STORES, INC.,
cl/h/a vVARSHAW'S GIANT
FOODS and GRAND CENTRAL
DRUGS, INC.,

Case
No.11034

am l

lJTAH RErrAIL GROCERS'
ASSOCIATION,

Int crrcnor-A ppellant.

BRIEF OF

GRAND
STORES, INC., d/b/a W ARSHA WS
OJ ANT F-,OODS aml GRAND CENTRAL DRUGS, INC.
DF~FENDANT-RESPONDENT

(~ENTRAL

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by the Trade Commission of Utah seeking an injunction against each of
tht' defendant-respondents to enjoin them from selling
merchandise in \'iolation of the Utah Unfair Practices
,\et. In particular, defendants are charged with viola1

tions of ~13-5-7 and ~13-5-9, Utah Code AnnotateJ (8upp.
1967) (the Unfair Practices Act). The Utah Retail Chocers' Association was allowed to intervene i11 the trial of
the matter and has filed a brief.
DISPOSITION

I~ THJ1~

LO\VER COURT

The case was tried to the court without a jur~·.
Based upon the stipulations of the parties and the evidence brought out at trial, the court held the Unfair
Practices Act in its entirety to be unconstitutional, void
and unenforceable in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and in violation of the Utah Constitution.
The ruling of the lower court was based upon its
findings of fact and conclusions of law filed and entered
herein in the record at pages 35 through 48.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent Grand Central seeks an affirmance of the judgment in the lower court and a declaration by this court that the Utah Unfair Practices Act
is invalid, unconstitutio1w.l and 0110nforcea ble.
STATE.l\I.B~N'l'

OF' FACTS

The statement of facts as contained in appellant's
ln·ief is substantially correct though incomplete. The
statement of facts contained in the brief of appellant-intervenor in many respects is substai1tially incorrect arnl
not based upon the record in the case.

SiILce neith0r appellant nor intervenor-appellant has
s('t forth a complete ancl accurate statement of the facts
founcl in this cas0, clefendant-respondcnt proposes as its
statement of facts the Findings of Fact entered by the
court. Those firnli11g-s as herein material were:
3. vVith respect to Count I of plaintiff' s complaint, def endaILts offered no defense thereto exc0pt the defense of unconstitutionality of the Act.
The allegations of Count I of the complaint must
accordiILgl)' he taken as true and the court therefore finds that on .Tune 23, 1966, defendants, and
0ach of them, advertised Crest Family Toothpaste at i10¢ which is a sale helow cost as defined
in the Act, with the intent and purpose of inducing the purchase of other merchandise or of unfairl)· dinrting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring a competitor and defendants will
continue to sell such item below cost as defined
in the Act unless tlwy art> enjoined from such
activity.
4. As alleged in Count II of plaintiff's complaint and as stipulated to by the parties, on or
ahont .June 16, 1966, Shopper's Discount Food
Store, Jnr., herein referred to as" Shopper's Discount," acfrertised and sold Aqua Net Hair Spray
at Ml¢ which was a sale below cost as defined in
the A ct. 011 .June 23, 1966 Grand Central advertisecl Aqua Net Hair Spray and Skaggs advertised St:de Hair Spray for sale at 49¢, each of
·which was a sale below cost as defined in the Act.
1\qna Net Hair Spray and Style Hair Spray are
rompetitin? arnl comparahle products ·with regard
to \\·eigM, ~ize, use, price mid customer demand.
Shopper's Discount, Skaggs and Grand Central
are all competitors in the same locality or trade
area comprising Salt Lake City and Davis Counties. Grand Central 's ach·ertisement and sale of

Aqua Net Hair Spray at 4-9¢ and Skagg 's ndvertisement and sale of Style Hair Spray at 4-0¢ was
an endenYor hy said defrndm1ts to med the 4-0¢
price of Shopper's Discount on Aqua Net Hair
Spray. Neither of said clef endants at said time
had any actual knowledge that the Shopper's Discount price on such item was a sale below cost as
defined in the Act or was not a legal price for purpsoes of Section 13-5-12 of the Act. On or prior
to June 23, 1966, plaintiff had not, to the knowledge of either of the defendants, taken any action
against Shopper's Discount to enforce the provisions of the Act against Shopper's Discount
with respect to its sale of Aqua Net Hair Spray
for 49¢. Aqua Net Hair Spra.Y is a product with
wide wholesale price fluctuations which can he
purchased by retailers, including defendants and
Shopper's Discount, in numerous ways and from
many different suppliers. Neither Skaggs nor
Grand Central on or prior to June 23, 1966 made
any inquiry of Shopper's Discount or the suppliers of Aqua Net Hair Spray to Shopper's Discount to determine the invoice cost of Aqua Net
Hair Spray to Shopper's Discount or the rcplncement cost of such item or the date of purchase of
such i tern by Shopper's Discount. Shopper's Discount as a competitor of <lcf endants would not
voluntarily supply defendants with information
relative to its invoice cost, replacement cost or
date of purchase of such item. The wide price fluctuation and numerous wholesale sources of supply
and differing purchasing methods made it infeasible and unrealistic for defendants to obtain reliable information of the invoice cost, replacement
cost or date of purchase of such item by Shopper's
Discount.
7. With respect to Count V of plaintiff's complaint, on June 23, 1966 defendants, and each of
4-

them, :HhertisPd Bayer Aspirin (100 cm) at 55¢
per lnmc1rcc1. Bayer Aspirin is supplied and delin'rrd clirectl!T to the clcfenclants' retail outlets
])y the supplier without cartage costs to the defendants. Bayer Aspirin is a product in constant
demand by customers of defendants with a high
turn-over and with little labor, 1rnste, spoilage or
adn1iising costs to defendants. The sale of Bayer
Aspirin at 55¢ hy Grand Central was not a sale
below cost as defined in the Act, but the sale of
the same item at the same price by Skaggs was
a sale below cost as defined in the Act.

9. With respect to Count VII of plaintiff's
complaint, on June 16, 1966 Grand Central acl,Tertised Lee men's pallJts at two pairs for $5.00,
which was a sale below cost as defined in the Act.
The sale by said defendant was not done with the
intent to induce the purchase of other merchandise, to unfairly di,Tert trade from a competitor,
or to otherwise injure a competitor but was done
with the sole intent and purpose of reducing what
Grand Central in good faith believed was an excessive inventory in their stores at that time of
Lee men's pants.
10. \:Vith respect to Count VIII of plaintiff's
complaint, on November 8, 1965 Grand Central
purchased frozen tom turkeys at 331/2¢ per pound.
Thereafter, on December 17, 1965 (more than
thirty days after the original purchase) additional frozen tom turkeys were purchased at an in\Toice cost of 371/2 ¢ per pound. On December 17,
1965 and thereafter, Grand Central had in stock
commingled frozen tom turkeys purchased on November 8, 1965 at 33 1h¢ per pound and tom turkeys purchased on December 17, 1965 at 371/2¢ per
pound. The commingled turkeys were subse-

quetly sold by Grand Central on and after December 17, 1965 for :n ¢ per pound, which was a sale
below cost as defined in the Act, in that the turkeys purchased N ovcmher 8, 1965 vvere sold more
than thirty days from the date of such purchase
and the replacement cost of the same at that time
was 37V:2¢ per pound and thE' turkeys purchaserl
on December 17, 1965 were sold at 37¢ which is a
sale below cost as defined in the Act. The sales
h~v Grand Central on or prior to DecemhE'r 8, 1965
of the turkeys purchased on N ovemher 8, 1965
were not sales below cost as defined in the Act.
11. Defendants offer for sale a wide variety
of merchandise in their retail stores, each item
of which has individual cost factors such as (a)
variance in consumer demand for the product, (b)
rate of turn-oYer, ( c) cost of adYertising, (cl)
handling costs, including warehousing, marking,
packaging, displaying, and purchasing costs, ( e)
,-arying depreciation in value sometimes depending on perishahility or seasonal demand and
sometimE's depending on obsolescence factors
(e.g., an improved product comes ou the market),
( f) labor, overhead and administrative costs, and
( g) trade and cash discounts, some of which cannot he determi1wcl or are not lrnown to dE>fendants at the time the goods are priced for sale.

12. Defendants, each using separate types of
accounting methods for the purpose of deterrmining proper profit and cost guidelines for their
merchandising opt>ratio11s, are each using sound,
arcepted and practical accounting procedures
with as much E'mphasis 011 detail as feasible.
Neither defendant attempts to accurately determine their cost for each item they sell, as to do
so would he too costly and, heneP, impractical am1
not feasible. Defendants cannot reasonabl~v he reqnirE'cl to establish acconnting procedures ~where(i

by their actual eost per item sold could be determim•d at or prior to the sale or offering for sale
of such item.
PRELHI I:N" ARY STArrEMENT
Since this appeal involns a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the general maxims of statutory
eom;truc.tio11 should be before the court. Defendant-respollllent Gra11d Central substantially agrees with the authorities cited hy appellant and intervenor-appellant
f hc•reinafter referred to generally as appellants] as to
the duties of this court with respect to declaring a statute
unconstitutional. A summary of the preliminary statements of appellants on this point can be ma.de as follows: In order to be unconstitutional, a statute must be
clearly \'iolative of a constitutional provision. Reasonable presumptions must be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute. If there is any reasonable basis for
the finding of validity, a statute must be upheld. DeJ\•ndm1t-1·espoll(lent does not argue with these authorities. '.\loreonr, it completely agrees that a statute
sl10ulrl he clec-larecl nuco11stitutio11al only when there is
no othr>r alternative.
ARGUl\fENT
The lltah Unfair Practices Act, involved in this
C'Hi'll', wa;.; enaekd hy the' Utah Legislature in 1937. The
Legisla t nn• was reacting to a popular fad of the time.
:-.r auy of the states wl1ich han similar legislation adopt<·d it at that time. These statutes were passed under
p1·pssl1l'e from com1Jetitors seeking to limit the play of

free-market prices, and in response to a prP\-alent marketing technique of the time, loss-leallcrs. Sale Bef 011'
Cost: Pri1;ate Pritc Fi.xi11_r7 r~11der Stotc Lau-, 57 Yal1·
L.J. 391 (1948). At that time, retailing as it is kit0\\"ll
today clicl not exiNt. Integration of the retailing-wholesaling and jobber functions liacl not lieen accomplished
to the degree and extent of toda;-. Under marketing
conditions then existing, when a retailer desired to purchase an item, he would generally purchase the item from
a wholesaler. Wholesalers were bound under the Robinson-Patman Act to treat all retailers alike. Howen'r,
under the present-day distrilrntion s;-stem, many operations such as clefcrnlants in this case perform their mm
wholesaling ancl/or jobbing func.tions. In purchasing directly from the manufacturer, these retail operations can
obtain and do obtain a much better price than can a competitor on a smaller operation who must purchase from a
wholesaler.
POINT 1
THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT,
IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A LESSER COST, COST AS DEFINED IN THE
ACT MEANS 6% ABOVE INVOICE OR REPLACEMENT COSrr, LESS TRADE DISCOUNTS, EXCEP'r CASH DISCOUNTS, PLUS
FREIGHT CHARGES 'WHERE THE RETAILER PAYS F' 0 R THE FREIGHT,
CRBJATES AN ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLJ1~ AND l'.NCONSTITrrrrONAL STANDARD.
In its presumption tl1a ( the co:-:t of <loi11g business
shall "in the absence of proof of a lessor cost ... be 6~;
8

()]' tlH· eost to the retailer ... '·, section 1:3-5-7 ( 3) (Jf the
l'tnlt Fnfair Practices Act does not take into account the
differrnt possible types of retail operations nor the
1 arious types of merchamlise \\·ithin each type of operation. The fact tli::it the statute does not make proYision
for r1iffere11t forms of operation is not surprising since
at the time of its adoption there was only one general
tnie of retailing opreation. A presumption that the
cost of doing husiness of a large-scale, self-service operation s11ch as defendants, \nth the integrated functions
of l'ctailN-wholcsalcr mid johber and that of a one-man
e11n10r grocery store who purchases his stock from a
\dJOlesaler is the same is totally outside of the common experience of man and is hence arbitrary and m11\·;1so1wl1le. F:ice Serrer v. Ci9arefte Serrice Co., 76 1\.E.
~d 91 (Ohio 1947).
Tltis unreasonable and arbitrary classification was
made by the L0gislature. The classification has been
nwde lJy a shift i11 legitimate business practice. At the
time th1• Legislature adopted the statute, the classification may well ha,-c been reasonable. HoweYer, the facts
i1tlrn<lneecl in this case and the findings of the court
1·l1·nrl.\- show that the classification as applied to defendant;; becomes unreasonable and arbitrary because it does
not take into account their type of operation.

110t

In C:reat Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F.
Snpp. 70, 82 (D. 1\Ii1111. 1938) the court set forth the
proper test for a Yalid presumption when it stated:
It is apparent from [cited decision of the U. S.
Supreme Court] that in determining the validity

of a presumption created b31 a legislatfrc body,
two questions arc ot be cnnsid er Pd: ( 1) Whether
the fact preswmerl may be fairly inferred from
the fact proven; (2) whether the presumption
created will be of aid to the state without subjecting the accused to unreasonable hardship or oppression. (Emphasis added.)
The presumption under the Utah Act meets neither of
the above tests. In its operation, the Utah statutory presumption of a cost of 6% is not a fair presumption and
it places an unreasonable burden upon the retailer. Cf.
Mott's Super Markets, Inc., v. Frassinelli, 172 A. 2d ;)81
(Conn.1961); Wiley v. Sampson-Ripley Co., 120 A. 2d 289
(Me.1956). This court should take into account the operational effect of the statute in question in order to see if
the tests are met. Such consideration is in accord with
Utah precedent. The case of Broadbent v. Gibson, 140
P.2d 939 (Utah 1943) was a case involYing the constitutionality of the Utah Sunday Closing laws. Beginning
at page 946, the court makes au extensive discussion of
the Utah statute and its exceptions. The court reached
the conclusion that the exceptions to the Act were so
hroad that they, in eff0ct, changed the Act from a ge11eral Sunday Closing law to a speeial Sunday Closi11µ;
law, and hence made it unconstitutional. The court goes
on to state that:
The exceptions in the Utah 8unclay closi11g statutes are so hroad that they in effect change the
nature of this aet from a general closing law, with
exceptions, to a law aimed, without sufficient legal reason, at certain class0s of husinesses with a
gene>ral exceptio1l to otlwr clm·rne;; \\·hich in effect
is a grant of a special priYilegt' to the e>xcepted
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elasR while without legal excuse denying them to
others. Broadbent v. Gibson, supra at 946.
The court further points out that these Sunday Closing
,c;tatntes were designed to avpl:v in enry locality and to
en'ry merchant throughout the state. As designed, the
court holds, such uniform application does not take into
account differences to be found in the various localities
throughout the State and hence is unreasonably discrimi1intory. Broadbent Y. Gibsou, su]Jra, at 946-47.
The Court goes on the state that in its opinion this
;.;tatnte could be construed in a manner which would make
it constitutional, but the Court does not so construe it.
'l'lms, the Court states:
rI] t could reasonably be held that the intention of
the Legislature in providing that confedionary
stores could stay open for the sale of confections
onl:- aml tobacco stores for the sale of tobacco
only \\·as designed to prohibit only the sale of
sneh items as razor hlades, stationery supplies,
IJirws, eigar and cigarette holders etc., rather than
to prohibit the sale of candy in a tobacco store
ancl Yice yersa. But the sta.tutes are arwku·ardly
dra1cn awl 11 hilc the overall intent seems to be
r1s outlined nf'xt abore, the specific exemptions
made and the language used in making them seem
to defeat the mm1ifest oL·erall intent. And even if
such 011 i1derprefotion were giren to the statutes,
t11ere zcould still be difficult problems of administration ich ich possibly iuould creat imconstitution(fl discriminations i11 such administration. Broad!Je llf Y. Gibson, supra, at 947. (Emphasis added.)
1

Rasc·<l upon this reaso11i11g, the Court held the statutes
to ll0 nneo11stitutio11al as being unreasonably discrimi11ntory. rrhc Utah U11fair Practices Act here challenge(l
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suffers from these same defects and shoulcl also be construed to he unconstitutional in its application. See Serrer Y. Cigarette Scrrice Co., supra.
Intervenor-appellant attacks the court's conclusions
that the Utah Act is discriminatory and arbitrary in its
application to both large and small merchants. They citc
in support the case of People v. Gordon, 234 P.2d 287
(Calif. 1951), and quote extensively therefrom. In analyzing the case of People v. Gordon, its factual basis
should first be considered. This was a case which arose
out of an injunction proceeding whereby defendants
were first enjoined, without opportunity for hearing,
from selling below cost. Defendants' motion to dissolve
the order was denied and after further hearing an order
was entered granting the injunction. It is significant to
note the following statement of the court found on page
291:
Moreover, ''state laws will not be invalidated
without the support of relevant, factual material
'''hich will 'afford a sure basis' for an informed
judgment" [cases cited]. In this case, no facts
whaterer have been adduced u:hich afford any
basis for judging the manner in LChich the art
affects interstate shipments or burdens interstate
commerce. (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that the main contention of def endants in the Gordon case was that the California Act "'as
in violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
Another factual mattcr which should be consiclere<1
in the Gordon case is the fact that the store Leing enjoined was a small one-storP operation. One of its argn12

me11ts ~was that the statute ~was unconstitutional in that
lnrge chain stores could buy at substantially lower prices
anu hence could sell at lower prices than the small store
nrnl come within the law. The defendant contended that
small stores were prevented from competing with these
larger concerns because the smaller stores could not sell
below their own higher cos,t. It will be noted that the
l'xact opposite is being argued in the case at bar. The
large stores are merely arguing that they should be able
to take a<lvantage of their better buying position and
se>ll at lower prices without having to put up with the
arbitrary and unreasonable six percent presumption of
the Utah Act.
At page 294 of the Gordon opinion, it appears that at
the hearings there was some evidence introduced (ex
1iart!!) as fo the affect of defendant's low-cost advertisi 11g. Competitors of defendant were called in to testify.
Howe,·er, the court admits that there was not much evidence. lt \ms sufficient, however, to support the discretion of the trial court in granting the injunction.

In sum, it should be noted that the Gordon case did
not present a set of facts upon which the court could
deeick the constitutionality of the Unfair Practices Act.
Tt shonlcl also be noted that in that case the fact situation
was exactly opposite that presented in the case at bar.
There, a one-store operation was alleging that it should
he allowed to sell below cost in order to meet the natural])" lower costs (although legal) of the large discount op(•ra tion. Iu the case at bar, all that defendant contends
is that the large discount operation should be allowed to
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sell at its cost plus operating expelli-J('S without the requirement of the six percent conclusive presumption.
Intervenor-appellant seems to argue that defenda11t
should haYe put on t•vidence showing that the six percent
presumption was not a Yalid estimate as to cost of doing
business. At page 28 of its lffief, intenenor-appellm1t
states:
How0Yer, there is no evidence as to ·what a reasonable percentage mark-up is in regard to any
item involYed in this case.
Of course, there is no e,-ide11ce on this point. The whole
pm·pose of this case is to show that defendants cannot
determine what a reasonable percentag-e markup would
be in nch-ance of :o:ale,,;.
Intervenor-appellaut objects to tlw finding of the
lower court that no real alternative exists to the presumption since it is impossible or unreasonable for ckfendants to have to compute their costs on each item of
groceries. Inten-enor-appella11t claims that this six percent presumutiou i11 fact aicls the clcfern1auts and gins
them ''an option; a retnilc1· ma:- eitlwr undertake the
detailecl accounting which thP ad r0qnires or merely presume a cost of doing business equal to six percent." Brief
of internnor-appellant at 2.). Cases cited ])y intenenorappC'llant make it quite clear that in an:- statute which
grants ·a presumption, thP lffesumption or the fact presumed must be reasonably related to the fads in existencP. It is :-rn1nnitk<l that the six percellt presumption
irnlnlg-ecl in liy tlio Utah statute hears 110 reasonable relationship to all~' ;1etnal fact. 'rhe lower court so fonll<l.
I11tern•nor-appel1n11t rrn1k<>s mnrh of tl1<> fact that de-

frn<lauts arc largr reiailrrs and lia.\·e access to computers
(Brief at 26) "\Yhieh coul<l easily make the allocation"
required by the statute. It is common knowledge that
('Onipnters cannot make an allocation which a man can110t make. The informatio11 must be fe<l into them in ordrr to get an answer.
At page 26 of its brief, intervenor-appellant makes
th<' argument that mere economic effect of the statute
should not he considered when ruling upon the constitutionalities of the statute. Any number of cases can
be cite<l which hold that economic effect may he the cause
of holding a statute unconstitutional. 'rl1is is the essence
of due process and equal protection. If the economic
<>ffrct of a statute is such as to unreasonably deprive one
of his proper or :rnbject him to unreasonable discrimination, it could certainly be the basis of holding a statute
1mconstitutional. See Broadbrnt v. Gibson, supra.
lnt<·1·,·enor-appellant makes much of its argument that
the six percent pesumption was enacted to aid the retailc•r rather than restrict him. This is not the case.
Snell presumptions are enacted as an aid to the prosecuto1·. Jfr~Rll/()11e v. (/eror, 292 N.W. 414 (Minn. 1940).
When thr statute pro,·ides that i11 the absence of airle11ce to the contrary, the eost of doing business shall be
111·0.'rnmPd to he six percent, a burden is placed upon the
1·l'taik)r to come up with P\"i<lence to the contrary. It is
\\'ell k11own as shown hy the fimli11gs aud the conclusions
of this ea:-;c arnl th0 evi<le11ec addueccl in this case that a
n)tailer cannot rcasmwhly show any cost prior to the
nctnal sale of ;111 itrm. 'l'herdore, the six percPnt pre-
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sumption becomes a conclusive presumption, and irrebuttable by the retailer. He must sell at the arbitrary markup of six percent or act at his peril.
At page 34 of its brief, intervenor-appellant cites
State v. Co11su1ner's TVarehousc Market, 329 P.2d 638
(Kan. 1958) in support of the proposition that the Kan~as statute which sets the markup of retailers at six percent in the absence of proof of lesser cost, ·was not arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory. The Kansas
statute in question in that case, as quoted by the court,
provides:
"It is here by declared that any advertising, offer
to sell, or sale of any merchandise, either by retailers or wholesalers, at less than cost as defined in this act, with the intent of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring a competitor, impair and prevent fair competition, injure public welfare, are unfair competition and contrary to public policy and the policy of this act, 'where the result of such advertising, off er or sale is to tend to deceive any purchaser or prospective purchaser, or to substantially lessen competition, or to unreasonably resfrain trade, or to tencl to creaite a monopoly in
any line of commerce.'' State v. Consumer's Warehouse Market, supra, at 640-641.
(Emphasis
added.)
It should be noted that the italicized portion of this Act
is different from the Utah Act, ·which speaks of "intent
and purpose" and does not speak of result. The action
in Consumer's lVarehousr Market arose on a motion
to quash the information 011 the grounds that the statute
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1ntc; uneonstitntional. Hence, there was no trial \vith
introduction of evidence. On appeal, the case was based
upon the information and the motion to quash filed by
defeuda11t. Defe11clant asserted that the statute was in
1'iolation of the Fourtee11th Amendment in that it violatccl clue process and equal protection. The court makes a
lengthy argument going along the N ebbia v. New Yark
line upholding the authority of legislatures to pass such
acts. Dcf enclant herein does not challenge the authority
of the legislature to pass such an act. 'What defendant is
challenging is the method and the reasonableness of the
a pplica ti on of the Act. As to the unreasonableness and
nrhitrariness of the Act, it should be noted that in Consumer's TT' arclwuse JJ!arket no evidence on these points
\\':ts introclucecl. In the case at bar there is ample evicleHce as to the unreasonableness and arbitrariness of
the application of the Act.
It should be fnrther noted that the statute involved
m Cm1s11111er's nrurcl1011se "~1arket contained a prima
fa.cie evidene0 provision, rather than a presumption such
a8 is coutained in the Utah Act. The distinction between
a J!ri111a facie evillcnce pro1-ision and a presumption is
ll(l('quately explained in IX "\Vigmore on Evidence §§24902-!'. l-± ( 3c1 eel. 1940) a11d must be considered when reading
thl'fH.; cases. \Vith respect to the prima facie provic;i011s of the Kansas Act, defendant challenged them as
hei11g unconstitutional and shifting the burden of proof.
rrlw court expressly did not set forth its views as to the
t'onstitutionality of this provision since it felt such quest ion was not raised by a motion to quash.
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In support of the proposition that "In California
a provision which allows a presum1Jtion of i11tc11t from
the mere sale below cost, without a limitation of supply,
has been held valid,'' interYenor-appellant cites People
v. Payless Drug Stores, 153 P.2d 9 (Calif. 1944), and
Mering v. Yolo Grocery & J.lfeat Market, 127 P.2d 985
(Calif. 1942). These cases do not support the statement
for which they are cited. These cases do not hold that a
mere sale below cost may result in a valid presumption.
Repeatedly, on pages 12, 13 and 14 of the Payless opinion, the court makes statements like:
Section 5 provides that in all actions brought under the provisions of the statute the proof of one
or more acts of selling below cost, together ivith
proof of the injurious effect of such acts, "shall
be presumptive evidence of the purpose or inte11t
to injure competitors or destroy competition.''
Proof of injurious effect is permitted to be shown
with the proof of sales below cost as a presumptive or prima facie <>vidence that the requisite
intent existed.
The Legislature merely enacted into law what is
common in human experience, that when a person
causes injuries by his acts he should be deemed to
intend such consequences unless he can excuse
or explain his conduct by facts showing that he
had an innocent intent. (Emphasis added)
Similar statements are found in the Mering opinion at
page 9~9.
From all of these quotations it will be noted that
the California Act iu addition to providing the presumption from the sale below eost, requires that i11i11ry he
shown. The Utah Act makes no sneh n'qnirement am1, ill
18

fad eliminates suC'h a requirement. Utah Code Ann. ~13:J-lJ (Repl. \·ol. 1962). No evidence was presented in
the case at bar that any injury had occurred. Hence,
the Utah presumption is much stronger than the one in
the California case cited by appellants.
Iu their arguments, appellants seem to vascilate bet\\een an argument that the statute requires reasonable11ess and an argument that difficulty in application of a
f-:tatute is no reason for its its invalidation. It is submitted that these are not distinct and different arguments. The standard of reasonableness as set forth in
the many cases cited by appellants may ·well be based
upon difficulty of application. See Broadbent v. Gibson,
s111Jra. \Vhat is the standard of reasonableness ·when defi11ecl in more explicit terms? This standard would seem
to be that which the normal, average, reasonable busilH:.'ssman could be expected to do. If, in its application,
a statute becomes so difficult that a normal, reasonable,
,,,·erage businessman could not be expected to comply,
thrn the Rtatute has failed the test of reasonability. There
are numerous casPs holding that unreasonable arbitrary
statutes should Hot be upheld. Upon close reading of
tlwRe caRes, it will be obserw>d that in many of them the
reason for the court's holding that such statutes are unreasonable and arbitrary is that they are difficult or impossibie to apply. E.g. Broarlbent v. Gibson, supra. Intene11or-appellant 's citations to W. F. Jensen Candy
('()1111mny v. State Tax Commission, 61 P.2d 629 (Utah
l!l36) and Robert ll. Hinckley, Inc. v. Statr Tax Comrnissio11, 404 P.2d 662 (Utah 1965) are entirely inapposite. Both of these cases i1wolved the collection and re19

mittance of sales tax. ln neither of th0 <·ases was there
any contention that the taxpayer cou1cl 110t determine
the amount of sales tax due. r:.L1 he only eonte11tio11 in both
of the cases was that due to the bracket system of collecting the tax, taxpayer could not collect the tax from
his purchasers, yet he had to remit the tax to the state.
All taxpayer had to do in either case to figure the tax
due was to take his gross sales times the percentage of
tax. This is no problem. There was no question of reasonability. Taxpayers knew the amount of the tax, and
they knew the exact amount of their sales.
The cases cited by intervenor-appellant on page 23
m support of its proposition that sale below cost statutes haw been upheld despite mere difficulty of application do not support this proposition. People -v. Kahn, 60
P.2d 596 (Calif. 1936), was a criminal case in which defendant was convicted on a plea of guilty. Therefore,
there was no evidence before the court at all as to difficulty of application of statutory standards.
On pages 24 and 25 of its brief, intenenor-appe1lant equates cost computation under the sale below cost
statutes to cost computations for profit and loss statrments. This is really not an equation. Cost computations for profit and loss purposes are made after the
fact. No one will contest the fact that accurate cost
computations can be made after sales. At the end of
the year it is not difficult to arriYe at a reasonable profit
and loss statement for the transactions which occurred
in the preceding year. Howeyer, it ~would be entirely unreasonable to arrive at a profit and loss statement at t11e
20

111·!..'.·in11i11g of tht> year for the futnre year. This is 'drnt
tl1is statute, in fact, requires. It requires the merchant
at his lH'ril to price his goocls prior to the time he sells
them, prior to the time he eYen pays for them in many
case:,; ancl 1wior to the time he receiYes mam- rebates
.
'
discounts ancl free goods. The trial court found this to
be uureasonable.
POINT 2
THE STATUTORY PRESlDIPTION OF PERCENTAGE YARKUP PRESENT IN THE
ACT "WITH ITS CRIMINAL SANCTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY GIVES THE BURDEN
OF PROOF TO DEFENDANTS.
Section 13-5-14 of the Utah lTnfair Practices Act
pro\·icles for iujunctin relief, and damages.
Section
18-3-13 Iffo,·ides a criminal penalty for violations of the
Act. It will be noted from a reading of the Act that the
prcn·isi011 for i11jm1cti,-e relief, the damages proYisions
and the criminal proYisions are based upon the same
statutory violation. The same operative facts constitnte a case no matter whether brought as a criminal
action, a riYil case for damages, or a ci\'il injunctiYe case.
The ;.;ame definitious of cost apply; the same 67a presumption applies; and the same definition of intent and
purpose is applied. The same defenses are a\-ailable, and
the :,;ame definition of replacement cost applies. The
presumption raised by Section 13-5-9(2) from proof of
limitation applies whether the prosecution be civil or
('riminal. Under this statute, the only difference between
a ciYil case and a criminal action is the form of the ac21

tion. There is absolutely no reason ·why the court shou1(1
not consider the criminal provisions of this Art. It is
obvious tha,t the civil provisions of this Act cannot he
held unconstitutional without perforce holding the
criminal provisions unconstitutional also. Accord, State
ex. rel. Auders<m v. Fleming Co., :~339 P. 2d 12, 18 (Kan.
1959). See Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake Co1111ty, 370 P.2d
:i55, 357 (Utah 1962). On this point, intervenor-appellant cites State Y. Barlow, 153 P.2d 647 (Utah 1944), appPal dismissed 324 U.S. 829, rehearing denied, 324 U.S.
891 (1945). The Barlow case is the Utah polygamy cas(•
and contains many issues. In the lower court thr defondm1ts vv0re convicted and ·were arguing· that a portion of the Act under which they ·were convicted was unconstitutional. The court he kl that that portion umlcr
which they were convicted was severable and therefore
could be enforced. In dictum the court stated:
No other part of the statute was invoked in the
trial of these cases, hence appellants have no
standing to question their validity. State v. Barlow, supra, at 655.
This case is no antliorit~· for a holding that this court
cannot consider the criminal penalties inYolvec1 iu thP
case now before the court. 8ee HeJ1rie v. Rocky Mfl!.
Packing Corp., 202 P. 2cl 727 (Utah 1949). Defendants
have stipulated to a set of fads which clearly put them
in vi.olation of the criminal statute>. The fact that 110
criminal action has ~-et been brought should not lw ckterminafrn' of ·whether 01· 110t the court considers these
sanctions. ln State v. Flc111i119, supra, thP court holds:
It is eh-mental that a niminal statute must he
d0finite. f ritation omittP<l]. Neither doPs the fad

that this is a civil suit and not a criminal action
help the statute enough to make it valid. We
1rn11ld read tliis statutr as a U"hole. (Emphasis
added.) State ex rel. AndPrson v. Flemin.g Co.,
suvra at 18.
The e\Tide11ce presented in the trial of this case applies
equally as well to the civil and criminal penalties. The
trial court had adequate evidence on which to base its
firnling that the presumption unconstitutionally shifts the
burden of proof to defendants. Henrie v. Rocky Mtn.
Packing Corp., 196 P.2d 487, (Utah 1948); rrhearing 202
P.2d 727 (Utah 1949).
The 6% presumption found in the statute was placed
there as an aid to the prosecutor or to the plaintiff. These
presumptions are generally put in statutes where the evidence to prove a fact is much more available to the defendant than to the prosecutor. Requiring a defendant
to go forward and rebut the presumption, hence, is not
deemed to lw too great a burden in many cases. In Morriso 11 \'. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934), the United
States flupreme Court announced the test for a permissible presumption where it stated that:
rrr]he state shall have proved enough to make it
just for the defendant to be required to repel
wliat has been proved \vith Pxcuse or explanation,
or at least that upon a balancing of convenience
or of the opportunities for knowledge thr shifting
of tl1e b11rdc11 u.·ill be fou11d to be an aid to the
acrnser without :;11bjecti11g the accused to hardsli ip or 0111;ressio11. (Emphasis added.)
.1crnrd, C:reat Atlantic & Pacific Tra Co. v. Errin, 23 F.
Nu pp. 70, 82 (D. 2\fom. l!l38).
This is the kst that should he applied in this case.
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vVhether or not tlw presumption places too great
a hardship or oppression upon the accused is dependt>nt upon the nature of the presumption. The presumption in the instant case, that cost i11 the absence of proof
of a lesser cost shall he 6%, in fact is an irrelmttable
presumption. The court found, and thE' evidence amply
sustains th0 finding, that defendants in many cases cannot compute an exact cost for any item. Since defendants cannot compute a ''lesser cost,'' or even a greater
eost, the presumption provided by the statute would prevail. The following possible sequence of events will
illustrate:
1. Defendant is charged with a \'iolation of a sale
below cost statute based on a sale of aspirin at 55¢.

2. At the time of priei11g this aspirin for sale, defendant did not know its actnal cost due to discounts
not yet received and various non-alloeahle costs involved
m merchandising.
3. Defendant cannot pnn-e a lesser cost and, as a
matter of fact, cannot prove a cost at all for the partieular item. Even if it could, this would he an afterthe-fact determination and would not help it set the
original price for which it has already sold the aspirin.
4. In the absence of proof of a lesser cost, the cost is
cleemecl to he 61r above invoice cost.
5. Defendant is convict eel of selling under invoice
cost plus 67; hasod upon the stre11gth of the presumption
alone.
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Genc'rall)· speaki11g, presumptions shift only the burden of going forward with the evidence and do not
shift the lmrden of proof. However, if a presumption
is to shift only the burden of going forward with the
c,·ide11ce, there must be some possibility of going forward with the evidence. Since in this case the court
fonml that it ·was in many cases impossible for defendants to "go forward with the evidence," the presump1ion becomes conclusive. Similar statutory provisions
han• het•11 held unconstitutional as shifting to the defrllCla nt the burden of proving his innocence. Mott's Su1wr :llarkets, Inc. Y. Frassinelli, 172 A. 2d 381 (Conn.
HJ61); Wiley \'.Sampson-Ripley Co., 120 A. 2d 289 (l\Ie.
1~):)6); Oreat Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F.
Snpp. 70 (D. l\fom. 1938). See also discussion of the
affect of this presumption under Point 1, supra.
onsicleri11g the lower conrt holding thait the 6% pre~unq1tio11 shifts the burden of proof to the defendant and
is lie!ll'l' mwo11stitutio11al, it should be iwted in answer
to appellant's nrgument at pages 30 and 31 of its brief,
that <lefemlants admit that a rebuttable presumption
<10<'8 iwt shift the bnrden of proof but merely shifts
1lie lmnkn of going forward with the evidence. However, as stated previously, the 6% presumption, to which
the' court found there vrns no alternative, is not a rebuttnhlr presumption but is a conclusive presumption. Since
t lie presumption becomes conclusive, it not only shifts
the lmrclrn of going forward but shifts the burden of
(

1

proof.
.At pages 31-32 of its brief, intervenor-appellant states
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that, "the state has the burden of proving a Yiolation [of
the 67o statute] before the defendant is required to
make any explanation." This statement is not borne out
by the record. Mr. Gordon Browning, Executive Secretary of the Trade Commission, when asked about the
Trade Commission enforcement procedure and how he
would find a sale below cost, stated:
Basically it is to find out exactly as to the complaint, and then to find a price, a low price, which
I would either contact one of the big wholesalers
or someone who buys in great quantities, and too
low to sell people at, they are at the wholesale
level, and I would get their price, plus the 6% of
their lead in cost, then I would have to use that
as a barometer to establish a low price. (R. 122123)
·when further questioned as to how he dete,rmined the
element of intent, Mr. Browning stated
Well, the fact that there £s a legal price would indicate to me that it could lw intended, if it is below the legal price, and a person knows it is belo"·
the legal price. I would have to think tha,t this, in
my mind, would be intention. ( R. 124) (Emphasis
added.)
From the above it appears that in its enforcement procedure, the Trade Commission is making a presumption of
intent which is not allowed by the statute and which, in
fact, places the burden of proof initially upon the defendant by reason of the presumption. The presumption
being conclusive in its application does shift the burden
of proof rather than the hnnlen of C'Orning forward to
defendants, since defendants, in fact, C'annot come
forward.
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In snpport of the proposition that a preseumption
as to cost, in the absence of a showing of lesser cost, has
been liehl to not unconstitutionally shift the burden of
proof to the dcf endant, intervenor-appellant cites McRllumr v. Geror, 292 N.vV. 414, (Minn. 1940). The factual background of this case should be brought out. This
\\'as a11 appeal from au order overruling defendant's demnrrer to the complaint. The trial court certified the
<1nestio11 as important and doubtful and from this certification defendant was allowed to appeal. There was
110 trial of the facts. The .Minnesota statute involved
in this case prohibited all sales "at less than the cost
thereof ... for the purpose of amd with the effect of inj11ri11g competitors and destroying competition." It
~-l10nlcl he 11otecl that at page 418 the court, in defining
cost, states:
Two eleme11ts comprise cost - actual outlay
for goods and the expense of doing business. The
la1Ner is defined in Mason's Minn. St. 1940
Supp ~ 3976-42, as "all current costs of doing
busi11ess ... '' '' r:L'he cost for the 12 month period
i111111erliately prccedi'llg or a shorter time if the
business is less than a year old, is made prirna
f acie evidence of current costs." (Emphasis
adde(l.)
'rhis statement is nr:T interesting in that it shows how
this statute was set up to au after-the-fact method of
ncf'ouutiug iu order to project future costs. As to the
Pffieacy of this case for the purpose cited, the following
q notp is essential, at page 419:
All this section adds is the declaration tha:t
10'.lc of list price is prirna facie evidence of cost
of doing business. Iu order to say that the infer27

rnce permitted is un\varranted, ,,.e must sav that
there is no rational com1ectiou beh\·een th~ emrent cost of Joing lmsinoss and 10~;{) of the invoice price. TVe do 11ot hare the facts and cannot
so hold. (Emphasis added.)
Hence, the court is saying that it did not luwe before
it in this case the facts to make a determination as to
whether this presumption as to the cost was in fact unconstitutional. \Vithout such evidence, the court has no
choice but to uphold the constitutionality of the statute.
At page 37 of its brief, intenenor-appellant eites
State, .. Eau Claire Oil Co., 151 N.W. 2d 634 C\Visc. 1967)
as being in accord with People Y. Payless Drug Stores,
153 P.2d 9 (Calif. 1944). The giRt of the proposition for
which this case is eited as support is that after proof of
a sale belmv cost and an injury resulting from Rnch sale,
it is not an undue hardship to place upon the defendant
the responsibility to come forward with the evidence of
its true intent as against the prima facie showing. To
begin with, it should be iwted that both of the abon-citcd
eases require a sale below cost and a11 injury resulting
therefrom. The Utah statute requires no such evidence
of injury and in the case at bar no proof or evidence
was offered by the State as to any injury resulting from
a sale below cost. As in the previous cases, it should be
noted that there was no trial upon the facts, no stipulation, and there was no evidence taken in the Eau Claire
case. The definition of cost as set forth by the court at
page 637 appears to he exactly the same as that in the
Utah Act. The rest of the Act appears to be substan
tially the same as the Utah Act, cxeept for the fact that

28

tliis statute contains a prima facie eYidence prons10n
\\·i 1h respect to intent in addition to the presumption as
to cost. This court held that there is a rational connection between the prima far:ie provision in the statute, e.g.:
... "evidence of any advertisement, offer to sell,
the sale of any merchandise by any retailer or
wholesaler at less than cost as defined in this section shall be prim.a f acie evidence of intent to induce the purchaser of other merchandise, or to
unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or to
0 therwise injure a competitor.''
1

arnl the intent requirement of the Ac1t. The· court was
11of commenting upon the presumption contained in the
stautc in audition to the prima facie evidence provision.
It was construing the prima facie evidence provision. In
effect, the court holds that it is rational to assume from
e\'idence of sale below cost and a resulting injury that
there is an intent to injure competitors. The court does
not hold that it is rational to presume a cost of doing
hnsiuess of '' X'' amount. The court expressly found in the
ease at bar that there is not a rational connection betwPen the fact presumed and the facts upon which the
pn•:·mmption is based.
POINT 3
THE STATU'rORY PRESUl\f PTION OF PERCENTAGE l\IARKUP Al\IOUNTS TO AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRICE FIXING BY THE
LEGISLATURE IN THAT THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESUl\IPTION, THAT OF
PROVING A LESSER ACTUAL COST, IS
NOT A REAL ALTERNA'l'IVE BECAUSE IT
IS IN ALL CASES IMPRACTICAL AND IN
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:MANY GASES DIPOSSIBLFi TO PROVE
THE ACTUAL COST OF A PARTICULAR
ITE'.\[ 01'' l\IFJRCHANDISE SOLD IN THE
TYPE OF R];jTAIL OPERATIONS CUSTOMARILY CONDUCTED B\r RETAIL l\IERC'HAXTS SUCH AS D]JFENDANTS.
The finding of the trial court that in many eases
proof of actual cost is impossible is amply supported hy
the evidence. There was testimony by the comptroller
of defendant Grauel Central that it does not refine its
costs to a per-item basis. There ~was expert testimony
that such refinement ,,·ortld 11ot be feasihk'. Since cost
cannot be feasibly refined to a per-item basis, it becomes
impossible to com<' up with a "lesser cost" tha11 the invoice cost plus 6j{ 11rovided Ji~- the statute. Standard
StorPs Y. Safeway Stores, luc., 195fi Trade Cases 1T 68, 153
(D. Colo. 1955). Because it is impossible to come up
with a lesser cost (or any other cost) a retailer must arbitrarily acld to his invoice or replacement cost the statutory 61/c. By requiring all retailern to arbitrarily add
to their im-oieo or replarement costs the st<1tntory 6)1c,
the sfatute, in fact, fixos prices at im-oiee cost plus the
statutory 6%. Generally speaking, for stores in the same
size e<1tegory, the im·oiee price will lie the same. _FJyen
the smaller store's, as was testified by :'.\[r. Sorenson of
Associated Grocers, ma~- partake of this lesser cost by
joining an association arnl lmyi11g in volume through tlw
association. (R. 147-14-8) The statute, through its presumption of 6%, which cannot he rebutted, unconstitutiorn1lly Hllows price fixing· in contraYC11tio11 of Artirk
XII, Sectio11 20 of thl' Utah Constitntio11.

As ably state(l hy this conrt in the case of Pride Oil
( 'u. v. Salt LakP Co1111ty, 370 P.2d 355, 337 (Utah 1962) :
One of the basic tenets of our system is that free
and open competition is a >vl1ol~some, stimulating
force in our economy. Our founding fathers recognized this and so indicated in our constitution;
rciting Section 20, Article XII, Utah Constitution] which is also implemented in our statutes.
f citing Section 50-1-1 Utah Code Ann. 1953.]
In the abon-citecl case the court held the provisions
of the :'.\Iotor Vehicle Code requiring posting of gasoline
prices to he unconstitutional. It is significant to note
that in the Pride case this court took notice of whether
or not the ac;tivity which the statute intended to control
.so serious];' affeced the public interest as to justify the
measures proposed for correction. The court stated at
page 356:
The sccollCl and more important one is that we
:-:.;0e no real likelihood that the restrictions they
place 011 the size and location of signs would materially aid in policing and preventing deception
of the public.
Tlw court then goes into the purposes of the sfatute and
states that the argument that these statutes are neces,-;ary to prevent deceptive advertising is "something less
1han candid.'' Such abuses, the court stated, have been
prnscrilwcl for many y0ars 11;'
Onr siatnte whirh denounces false and deceptive
advertising [ ritatiom; omitted]. From the record of
the hearing hcforc the trial court, it is evident
that this \YHS not the only motivation behind the
statutes in question. Tliei"°r 11assagc by the legislature 1rns s11011sorcd l;y the i1derrcnors, the Utah
.1ssociatio11 of Petroleum Dealers. From the testi;31

mony of their ,,-itnesses, it is plni11ly nirleJ1t tlwt
a rcry i111 porfa11t cn11sideratio11 prompti11g support of this legislation 1cas to control gas price
1cars. PrirlP Oil Co. Y. Salt LakP County, s11pra at
3.31. (Emphasis acldecl.)
Quoting further from the court:
Despite a,·erments and innuendos to the effeet that the latter [gas wars] are in the long run
inimical to the puhlic interest, ice ore not c011ri11cerl that they pose Oil!f such da11per to the pul1lic as slio11lr11carra11t inrnsio11 of the constitutional riglits of tlie co111plaiJ1i11.r; rlcalers. Pride Oil Co.
Y. Salt Lake County, .'lllira. (Empha-.;i,;: a(1decl.)
Based upon the reas0ni11g of the court in the Pri1le Oil
case, it is not improper for the, cnnrt in thi" ca,;:e to lo(Jk
into the purpo,;:es of the statute and it-.; effect i11 fact.
rather than ju,;:t going along with the statt,c1 purpo-.;es of
the statute.
Like the statute m the Pride Oil cast-. the statute
i1n-oh-ed iu the pre,;:ent case i-.; also in fact a price-fiC1:i11z
statute and. as such. is ,-inbtiw of _\rticlt> XII. St>ctiou
:20 of the rtah Constituti•111. In the ca-.;c of (;01,1111 11/i 1.
FedPraferl Jlilk Producers A ..:..~u .. Inc .. 3ti0 P.:2d 101~
(rtah 1961). this court held that SectiPn Hl-_.\.. of the
l~niform _.\..gricultnral Cooperatiw _.\..ssociation _.\..ct did
not permit associations to control prices in ,-iolation
of the Constitution. In so lwldimt. thi~ court ,;:tateL1 tl1at
an agreement bet\\·et·n nwrnl ,ers of a cooperatin' as~ocia
tion to fu minimum prices for ,,-Jiil'l1 milk was tu he
sold \n1S Yiolatfre of _.\..rticle XII. Section ~Cl of the Constitution. The si!!11ificant pn rt (1f this <«lSl' is it" uplwhl-

nrnl r1uoting from the prior case of General Electric
Co.,._ T/1rifty Sales, Inc., 301 P.2d 741, 748 (Utah 1956).
in~·

In the General Electric case, this court held the
nah Fair Trade ..:\ct to he an iirrnlicl price fixing in violati<rn of ~\rticle XII, Section 20 of the Constitution.
The conrt stated:
'J'he f ecleral anti-trust laws ·were only acts of Congress, which may readily be modified by subsequent enactments; whereas our anti-price-fixing
pro\·ision is in our Constitution, which must pre,·ail o\·er an~- statutory enactment inconsistent
therewith, ho1cecer laudable or desirable, or hou·erer 1rise or eu 11 neu',ssary for the public welfare
such legislation may seem. General Electric Co.
'. Thrifty Sales, Inc., supra. (Emphasis added.)
0

Further considering the Fair Trade Act, the court
went into an extensi\·e discussion of the intent and purpose of the Fair Trade Act and then a discussion as to
\d1etlwr the Fair Trade Act accomplished the purpose
claimed for it. Discussing the arguments existing on
hoth sides, the court, at page 749, states that:
It is also plansably argued that instead of
1Jeing a boon to small retailers as plaintiff argues,
the Fair Trade Act is actually detrimental to them
iu that it prennts them from getting ahead by
efficient operation. That is, by assuring price and
profit, it encourages additional retailers to enter
the field, spreading the income thinner among
<lealers. It is reasoned that the public should not
liace to bear tlir additional cost of supporting
more retailers, but if business grai·itates to more
efficie11t 011es zclw can sell at lo1Cer prices, the
LJ.117Jlic should hare tlze benefits of this efficiency.
(Emphasis added.)
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Further, the court states
The difficulty 1l'ith the ty1Je of "11rice fix-

ing" here in question, ere11 if it lt'ere for the salutary purposes contended by the plaintiff, whether
it be a little or a lot, is that it is a 1·iolation of our
Constitutio11. It is like sin, a little sin, if properly
so classified, is just as definitely sin as a great
quantity of it, and hardly to be apprond under
t.he pretext that it is so small an amount that it
can really be regarded as virtue.
Although \\'e are aware of the fact that all
doubt should be resolYed in favor of constitutionality [citations omitted], it nen~rthcless appears
from the interdiction agamst a11y ''combination
... having for its object or effect the co11trnlli11g
of the price . . . of any article of manufacture ... " that the framers simply did not want
price fixing by any combination. TV e see 110 reason which would im1;cl us to ignore nor to rnry
from the plaii,n import of the 1.cords of the Constitution [citation omitted], evcn though events may

have occurred which prohabl~, were not foresee11
at the time the provision was adopted. rcitations
omitted.] l:Ve do 11ot regard tlte situation here

presented as inrnfring the regulation of prices
where the public health, morals or welfarP may be
affected and the question of legislative police jJOlf'er under such circumstances is 11ot here dealt zritli.
General Electric Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Ilic., supra.
ait 751-752. (Emphasis added.)

From the above-cited cases nnd the quotatio11s therefrom, it will be seen that this court has, in fad, consi<lered cases under Article XII, Seetiou 20 of the Co11stitution. In so consideriug these cases, the court has not
been hesitant to look at the real purpose> of the :-;tatntr,
aside from the lcgislatiYcl)'-statc<l purpo:-10. 1'po11 tl1i:'
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antl10rity, the court is not precluc1ccl from looking into
1h<• real pnrpose and effect of the sale-below-cost statute.
rt is :c;ubmittetl that the lower court's finding that this
statut8 is a priec-fixing statute and violative of the Con:-:1itution is based upon the e\'iclence adduced at the trial
ot' tlie matter and is elearly supported by such evidence.
[t should also be 11oted that the federal government has
rnnsidered this question and concluded that persons joining together, such as intervenor-appellants' members in
tli<' case at bar, to seek enforcement of sale below cost
aeits arc iu violation of Sherman Act price maintenance
prn\'isions. [T. S. v. Co11nccfic11t Food Council, foe., 19401943 Trm1e Cases. 1FiG,167 (D. Conn. 1941); U.S. v. Masso.rl1Usctts Food Co1111c·il, 1940-1943 Trade Cases 1156,165
(P. '\fass. El41); [!. S. v. Rhode Island Food Council,
luc., HJ40-1043 Tradt> Cases 1156,175 (D.R. I. 1941).
At page 32 of its hrid, intenenor-appellant comm0nces its argument that the Utah Constitution, Article
XII, Ser:tiou 20, does not prohil)it the sale below cost act
as pricP fixing. In support of this proposition, inter1·enor-aprw llan t ci tcs R iggi11s v. District Court, 51 P .2d
G4-;) (Utah 1935). A close reading of this case will disclo.<;<' Uiat it has nothing to do with price fixing. This
<'ase was a test of the state lir1uor control lavvs. The
eonrt hel<l that th2 state can be in the liquor business and
not lw in violation of this statute. It should be noted that
there was no facrtual development in an adversary-type
lirnring.

At page 33 of its brief, intervcuor-appellant, in support of the proposition that the Unfair Practic·es Act is
not a price-fixing measure, cites Burt v. lT'ools11late, foe.,
146 P.2d 203 (Utah 1944). In that case, plaintiff was
suing defendant for breach of contract and defendant
was basing its defense upon the Fair 'l'rade Act and the
Unfair Practices Act. Defendant was in essence saying that since it ·was selling its product at $37.50 per ton
to everyone else, a contract to sell at $32.50 per ton to
plaintiff was void under the Act. It should be noted that '
the portion of the Act involved there was the Anti-dis- ,
crimination Section or the Little-Robinson-Pa.tman Act.
The court held that such a defense could not be made
upon the basis of the Act. Hence, any language purporting to discuss the Act is purely dictum. It should also
be noted that the court in Burt made much of the fact
that the case had not been adequately briefed and argued
and that many points had not been raised in the brief
which should have been raised. 'l'he case was remande<l
for trial on the facts with relation to the contracit, 8ince
there was some problem with the trial court's interpretation of the contract. The Burt case did not bring into
question the constitutionality of the Unfair Practices
Act. The only question was 'vhether or not the defendant
would, by honoring the contract, violate the Act and the '
court held that the defendant could not use the Act as ,
a defense.
Intervenor-appellant further cites in support of this
proposition Wholesale Tobacco Dealers' Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., 82 P.2d 3, (Calif. 1938). The
facts of this case are distinguished infra. Ho"-ever, it
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slwul(l he 110ted that there was not a hearing on the

merits in the cast>. The case came up on defendant's
aclmissio11s to ,-iolations of the Act. In response to the
argument that the court should not go behind the purpose of the statute as stated by the Legislature, the court
~tated:

In the first place, mere sincerity or honesty
of purpose on the part of the legislature does not
alone justify the statute. The declaration in the
statute as to its purposes, does not determine
1chether the means provided in the statute are reasonably designed to accomplish those purposes.
The courts may properly inquire into the subject.
lVholesale Tobacco Dealers' Bureau v. National
Carndy & Tobarco Co., supra, at 11. (Emphasis
added.)
This case clearly supports the authority of the trial
court to make the findings made.

It should be noted that the objections made to the
:-,tatute involved in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers were that
it was in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. As far as
the case states, there was no objection as to any violation of any California constitutional provision such as
Article XII, Section 20 of the Utah Constitution. At page
15 the court states:
In its true sense, it [the Aci] is not a price-fixing
statute at all. It merely fixes a level below which
the producer or distributor may not sell with intent to injure a competitor. (Emphasis added.)
But while the comt makes the above statement, all
'
of the cases it cites supporting the action of the Califor37

ma legislature were price-fixing cases, cases which upheld the right of a state to fix minimum prices under its
police power.
In General Electric v. Tltrifty Sales, s111Jra, the Utah
Supreme Court helcl the Utah Fair Trade Act to be unconstitutional as a price-fixing statute. That statute itself did not fix prices. The court found that the eff'ect of
the statute was to fix prices. The trial court in the illstant case concluded that the effect of the Unfair Practices Act is to fix prices. Such being its effect, the Unfair Practices Act also violates Article XII, Section 20
of the Utah Constitution.
Intervenor-appellant argues that the statutor~- 6~~
presumption is not a price-fixing statute, but is in fact
an aid to the retailer. This position goes contrary to
the general purposes of presumptions in all statutes as
set forth above i11 Point 2. The reason for haYing a
presumption is to aid the plaintiff or the prosecution
where the facts are not rea<lily anlilahle to them. The
presumption in fact put::-; a burden upon the clefenclant
to go forward with the eYicknce, which burden he ~would
otherwise no{ haw. Hence, it is quite difficult to say
that the presumption in this ease aids the defendants.
Intervenor-appellant further likens this presumption to the 1070 standarcl deduction fll'Ovisions in Fc<1era1 and state income tax laws. This analogy is completel~- inapposite. Both FP<krnl arnl stak income tax

laws allow a 10% stauuard deduction in place of an
it<>mizNl deduction. Howeyer, it will be noted that
uwlcr .b~elleral and state income tax laws, it is possible
to keep records and itemize your deductions. This itemizD tiou is an after-the-fact computation which is not at all
Jiffienlt. Hence, there is a reasonable alternative to the
lO~lr standard deuucition. It should also be noted that
tlie 10% standard deduction does not involve any presumptions. A taxpayer need not even take the 10%
standard deduction if he does uot wish to take it. He
,,·ill not he prosecutecl for a crime nor will he be sued for
damages. Under tax laws, at the end of the year a per:-:011 can sit down with his books and records and determine exactly what he has spent for various items. In
contrast, the 6% statute would require a person to sit
<low11 before he sells an item, before he incurs rents, before he pays his light bill, before he pays wages, and other overhead expenses, and allocate to each bottle of
aspirin that he sells a specific portion of each of these
exrwn:-:cs. The record keeping required for tax purposes
is not burdensome and not impractical because it is an
nftp1·-the-fact record keeping system. It is submitted
that this is the exact system upon which defendants opPratt-. TlH' court has found that operating under this
s~·:-:tern, the 6% presumption pro,·ides no alternatives to
tlwse dPfcndants since they eannot prove a lesser cost.
Iutenenor-appellant argues that the court misinterpreted the statutory term "cost" as requiring an
l'Xact standard. Iuknenor-appellant cites the case of
Hol.2:er v. Caler, 74 P.2d 839 (Calif. 1938) as being a
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case holding the statute invalid as requiring a showing of
exact cost. A reading of the cat-Jc cited by internnorappellant reveals that this was not tho holding of the
lower court in the case. This case does not discnss a
showing· of exact cost. In fact, this case ·was decided
upon an eviclentiary question and all of the talk in the
case ·with respccit to the constitutional questions is dictum.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the case based
upon evidcntiary facts and held that it did not need to
reach a constitutional questio11. Balzer v. Caler, 82 P2d.
19 (Calif. 1938).
In further support of its proposition that an exact
showing of cost neeJ not 1Je made, i11ten-enor-appella11t
next cites People v. Payless Drug Stores, 153 P.2d ~J
(Calif. 1944). Intervenor-appellant is entirely incorrect
in citing this case for the proposition "cost" means a
figure arri,-ed at by reasonable accounting methods.
The court in this case held that the factual background for determining the constitntimrnlity of the co8t
provision was not presented a11cl hence could not be decided. People v. Payless Drug Stores, s11pra, at H,-15. In
neither the Payless case nor the Trholesale Tobacco
Dealers case relied upon hy intencnor-appellant was
the factual presentation sufticie11t to allow a decision on
this issue. Therefore, the holcling contended by intervenor-appellant for these eases is not i11 fact the holding.
The eourt in People Y. Payless Drug Stores, supra, at
page 15, states:
[A]ny difficulty in computing- eost is a factual one,
aml statutes are not dN·lared im-alicl because in

40

their application factual difficulties may arise.
(Emphasis added.)
In holding that factual difficulties may not invalidate a

statute, the California Supreme Court is not holding that
factual impossibility or unreasonableness cannot be the
basis of invalitlation of a statnte. In Broadbent v. Gibson, 140 P.2d 939 (Utah 1943), the Utah Supreme Court
held that the Utah Sunday Closing law could not be
applied uniformly throughout the state without being
unreasonably diseriminatory. The holding of the court
was based in part upon the difficulty of administration of
Ruch a law and the discriminations arising from such administration. In the instant case, the district court held
that the requirement placed upon defendants to ascertain
their costs prior to selling these particular items would
be unreasonable. This was strictly in accordance with
the cYidence in the case.
In further support of its contention that "cost" as
11s(•cl in the Utah statute should be construed to mean an
m·eragP cost rather than an exacit standard, intervenornppellmit cites the case of State v. Langly, 84 P.2cl 767
(\\'yo. 1938). At page 14 of its brief, intervenor-appel1aiit states that:
The Langly opinion answered the contrary holding of the California lower court in Balzer v.
Caler, supra, which was later disapproved also by
the Supreme Court of California as noted above.
No reasonable reading of the cases cited by inrtervenor-appellant can be said to hold that the California
Supreme Court disapproved the constitutional issue in
Bal.zcr v. Caler. As stated above, that case did not reach
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the constitutional question. The case was not even cited
in People v. Payless Drug Stores, s11pra, nor lVliolc.sale
Tobacco Dealers' Bureau "· NatioJ1al Candy & Tobac·r·u
Co., supra., the cases upon which intervenor-appellant
relies.
Intervenor-appellant also relies on the -Wyoming
case of State v. Lm1gly, .supra, as upholding their contention that the term "cost" is not unconstitutionally
Yague and ambiguous. They fail to mention the facts of
the Longly case. In that case, the defendant entered a
plea of guilty to a criminal charge under the -Wyoming
statute, and thereafter filed a motion in arrest of judgment claiming that the statute was unconstitutional.
Therefore, there was no trial upon the merits of the
case. The trial court had no evidence before it as to the
actual facts. Hence, any determination with respect to
the constitutionality of the statute involved could not
have been based upon the reasonability of its applicatiou,
since the application of the statute was not questioned hy
the eYidence. In fact, the majority of the court felt that
it ·was not even necessary to discuss the cost defiuition portion of the s.tatute. State Y. Lmzgly, supra, at 781. Intervenor-appellant at pages 14 and 15 of its brief, cites a long
quotation from the aboYe case. The quotation, in itself,
dictum though it may be, proves the case for defenclautrespondent. In order to get the full meaning of this
quote, the entire secition should be quoted, including the
part omitted by intervenor-appellant.
rrhese illustrations suffice to show the obstacles in
the way of the legislature to do what the Calif ornia court abon-mention<:>cl intimates should be
-±2

done, and that these matters had better be left to
general business methods. The legislature, doubtless, had such general business methods - reasonable standards of cost-accounting for the various classes of business - in mind and believed
them to exist. If they do not exist - if cost cannot be ascertained - then the act in question
should be held to be unconstitutional. If, on the
other hand, cost is ascertainable, under reasonable methods, then such cost is purely a question
nf fact, definite and certain, and the standard of
conduct set by the legislature, too, is definite and
certain. The non-e.ristence of such reasonable
methods ca1111ot be presumed by the court, and if
tl1at is so, then the burden of showing it, in order
tl1at we might act up611 it, 'Was on the defendant,
for upon him lies the duty to show the statute to
be 11nconstit11tional [citation omitted], but no evidence 1cas introduced in this case .... Hence, we
should hardly be justified, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, in holding that it did not
hm-e in mi11d [the Legislature] such reasonable
accounting methods in the belief that they in fact
c•xist .... In that ....-iew of the case, the standard
s0t by the legislature is virtually reduced to one
of "reasonableness." And it is held that "reasonableness" as "the standard of an aet which
can he determined objectively from circumstances,
i o; a common, widely-used, and constitutionally
,·alid standard in law." State v. Langley, supra,
at 770, 780. (Emphasis added.)
Th<• ':ery cases cited and relied upon by intervenor;1p1w llm1t pro....-e the case for defendant. The Langly
('()11rt, i11 dictum stated that if cost could not be ascertai1wd, then the Act in question should be held unconstitutio1rn l. The lower court in the instant case found ( 1)
that defendants were using reasonable, cost-accounting
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methods, and (2) that it 1rnuld be unreasonable to require defendants to refine their costs as required by the
Act since cost in many cases cannot be so refined. Tlw8e
findings of the court are supported Ly the evidence. It
should further be noted that in this case cited by intervenor-appellant, the court did not have before it eYidence upon which it could rightly decide whether or not
the statute was unconstitutional in its use of the term
"cost." Therefore, it was only proper that the statute
be upheld. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the court stated:
[W] e must presume that the legislature did not
intend to prescribe that the cost must be absolutely exact, that it must be based upon the precise method of accounting which any one merchant might adopt, but meant, by "cost," what
business men genera1ly mean, namely, the approximate cost arrived at by a reasonable rule. State
v. Langly, supra, at 779. (Emphasis added.)
This language of the court is pure dictum. See State Y.
Larngly, supra, at 781. The cases cited by interveuorappellant as being in accord with this Yiew, without exception, are also cases which arose without a trial 011
the merits. Wholesale Tobacco Dealers' Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., 82 P.2cl 3 (Calif. 1938), was
a case which came up upon an admitted violation of the
Act. There was no trial. The sole question presented
on appeal had to do with the constitutionality of ccrtai11
sections of the Act. From the agreed state of facts which
the court sets forth, it would appear that the "cost''
question was moot in this case, since cost of doing business was a well-established fact in the industry involved.
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1J'li0lesalc Tobaceo Dealers' Bureau Y. National Candy &
Tobacco Co., supra at 7. Hence, it will be s0en that this

is e11tirely iuapposite and nonsupport for the proposition cited. The question of cost was not a factor in the
case, and no eYidence was taken as to the reasonableness
of a eost determination. Further quoting from the same
statement of the court:
TVe h ave no way of ascertaining in this case
l'HRC

whether the proi·isions relating to the cost of
doing business contained in the act are too uncertain and indefinite to reasonably be applied by
any merchant. Appellant and its supporting amici

curiae urge with great \'ehemence that it is practically impossible for any merchant to have available the necessary facts for calculation of cost of
<1oing business as applied to each article during
the course of any current year. Respondent and
its supporters urge that simple and proper accounti11g practices will disclose the necessary information. Under such circumstances the issue
C'a11not and should not be determined in this proceeding. TYhen and if the issue is properly pre-

sented against a pro per factual backgroimd with
the appropriate euidentiary material, this court
can then and only then determine the reasonableness of this provision. Wholesale Tobacco Dealers' B11rea11 v. National Candy and Tobacco Co.,
supra. (Emphasis added.)
Associated 111 ercha.nts v. Ormes her, 86 P.2d. 1031
(:l\1011t. 1939) is also cited as being in accord with the
La11gly case in upholding the proposition that cost need

not be specifically determined. The eYidence in this
ease, on appeal, consisted only of the judgmenrt roll withont the CYidenee adduced at trial. The court stated at
page 1032:
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[HJ ence the oHly question for us to detf>rmi1w is
whether Chapter 80 is Yalid. Tltis we must determine from the Act itself lt'itl/011t the aid of factual
background sa1·e as appears from the findings of
fact. (Emphasis added.)
There was no fi11cli11g of fact as to the reasonableness or
nnreasona blcness of the cost cletermiua ti on prm-ision.
At page 1036 the court qnotcs exknsiwly from Staff! \'.
Langly and comes to the conclusion that the Legislature
has, by the Unfair Practicrs Act, virtnally enacted a rnlr
of reasonableness. If the test is rcasona blencss, the lo\\·er con rt in the instant case found as a matter of fact and
as a conclusion of law the 1·equirements of the Utah
statute were unreasonable as applic•d to these dcfenclanls.
State Y. Sea rs, 103 P.2cl 331 CW ash. Hl40) is also
cited in support of the proposition that cost need not he
specifically determi11cd. That casP arose upon the owrruli11g of a demurrer and clefomlant ha,·ing elcetecl to
stand on his demurrer apprale(l. There "·as no cYiclence taken as to the application of the statute to specific facts. The case was deeided wholl;- upon the pleadings and the law invoked. At page :344 thr court statPs:
If ·we had before U8 a proper far·tual uad·ground, we might more easily d0termi11e whether
(\r not the terms "cost" a ncl "cost of doi11g lrnsiness," as rlefiued 11;- cha pt er [sic] 221, a re not too
uncertain and indefinite to reasonably he applied
Jn- any merchant, lnrt we ha re in this case mily the
l~11g11~ge of the statute, and we arc: not prepared
to say at this time, judged by the language of the
statute a101u', that simple and prnper accounting
practices ''"ill not disc lose tho 11ecessa ry information. ( J;~mphasis ad<led.)
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It can he seen from the facts of this case and the lang·uage of tlie court itself that the court did not consider
that the prnper factual hackgrouud had been presented
for the determination of the reasonableness question as
to cost determination. The court had no other choice
but to uphold the statute.

Intenenor-appellant further cites the case of Dikeou
Y. Food Distributors Ass'n, 108 P.2d 529 (Colo. 1940), as
support for the proposition that cost need not be specifically determined. Cited as upholding the constitutionality of the averaged cost determination, this case
is inapposite. At page 531, the court states:
The co11stit11tio11ality of the Act is not challrnged either in the briefs or assignments of error. (Empasis added.)
Flouk Oil Co. Y. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co.,
::l4D P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1960) is another case cited by inll•rnnor-appellant iu support of this same general
prnpositi011. The posture of the case is adequately set
fol'th in the following quofo from page 1009:

In seeking reversal, the plaintiff raises the following points: (1) that it was improper to determi1w the constitutionality of the Act on motion to
clismiss; that the lack of valid standard is not apparent 011 the face of the statute and consequently
the quc>stion of adequacy of the standard is ascertainable only in light of the evidence 011 the trial.
The appellate comt clid uphold the statute but it had
uo alteruati,-e. It had no evidencP as to reasonableness
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of the standard of cost and henre could not hold the
standard unconstitutional. At page 1013 the court makes
an extensive quotation from TVlw!esalc Tobacco Dealers
Bureau of Southern California, Inc., v. National Candy &
Tobacco Co., supra, in which the California court comments upon its inability to pass upon the constitutional
question because the issue is not properly presented in
an adeqnafo factual background. The Flank case, in approving and restating this position taken in the California case, is in fact saying that it has not had the proper
f'videntiary background presented. Hence, the court in
the Flank case was not considering the reasonableness of
the "cost" cletermination stall(larcl since it did not han'
before it the proper evidence to do so.
Internnor-appellant further cites the case of People
v. Kahn, 60 P.2d 596 (Calif. 1936) as upholding the
California statut0 against the '' ,·oid for \'agneness'' drf ense. Defendant in that case was argning that the term
"cost" in the statute involved was so vague and. ambiguous as to make it impossible to comply ·with the statute.
It should be noted that this was a criminal case which
arose upon defendant's pka of gni1t)·. Therefore, as in the
other cases cited by intervenor-appellants, there \YHS no
competent e\·idence 1Jefore the court as to reasonableness
or to show impossihility or possibilit)· of proving cost.
In upholding the statut0, the court in the Kahu cmw
also made much of the fact that the statute required all
intent to injure rompetitors and. destroy competition.
Hence, the uncertainty of the cost determination was
aided b)· the requirement that actual i11te11t to injure com-
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pditors and destrny competition be shown. The Utah
.td here questioned does not require a showing of acitual
intent to injure competitors and destroy competition. All
that is required is "an intent and purpose of inducing
the purchase of other merchandise." The Utah Act presumes that such an intent is bad and should be punished.
Lt is tlonbtful, had such a presumption been available
m1der the California statute, whe1her the California
eonrt would ha\'e upheld the Act.
In contrast to the factual bases upon which the cases
eitNl h~· inte1Tenor-appellant arose, the case of State ex
rel. Ai/(lerson v. Fleming Co., 339 P.2d 12 (Kan. 1969),
arosL· after a trial on the merits in an action for an injnnetion. The statute there involved (an unfair practil'es art applying only to milk) was held unconstitulio11al heea use it had no definition of cosrt. The court
n•;jec!ecl the "good faith" argument based upon the difficulty in accounting and bookkeeping systems. Under
different systems, cliffprent costs would be determined.

For the proposition that the Unfair Practices Act
·with its presumption as to cost to the retailer is not a
Jiriee-fixing measure, intervenor-appellant also cites Rust
1·. Uriggs, 113 S.\,V. 2cl 733 (Tenn. 1938).
The appeal in
that case arose on the overruling of a demurrer filed by
the dC'f endant "·hich challenged the construction put
npon the Act hy complainant and which also challenged
the rnlidity of the whole Act. A chancellor overruled the
demurrer and grantetl the injunction as prayed. The def rndant elected to stand upon his demurrer, sought a
special appeal and was granted a special appeal to the
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Supreme Court of Te11nesser. Thr cm;e did no·t arise
from an exploration of the faets at trial. The merits of
this case were never tried. It should be 11oteu that as to
the price-fixing issue, the court summarilv dismissed the
issue without even considering it.
In consideration of this statute \Ye may first obseri·e that it is not a price-fixing law. · It is not
therefore necessary to co11sider decisions of this
court and the Supreme Court of the United States
respecting statutes of that sort. Rust Y. Griggs,
supra, at 735. (Emphasis added.)
As can be seen from this language (which is all of the
language rel a ting to price fixing in the case) the court
did not eyen seriously consider the matter for which
intervenor-appellant cites the case.
InterYenor-appellants further cite this case in support of their proposition that 6% presumptions as to cost
have generally been upheld. Again, the factual background of the case should be noted and it should be observed that there was no e\·idence before the court as
to the effect of this presumption, as there is in the i11stant case. Rust v. Griggs, supra at 736. It is also interesting to note the difference in the statute inyolved iu
the Rust case which allowed the price or cost to be srt
at "cost to the most efficient retailers." In the case at
bar, cost must be set at a "proportionate part" of one's
own cost. As to the quote on the bottom of page 33 of
intervenor-appellant's brief, it should he 11oted that the
facts of the Rust case seYerely water its efficacy. Drfenclant-Respondents' case is made hy the last sentcJtcr
of the last sentence of the quote. Intcrn~uor-appellallt
quotes "the presumption t hns ncated of course may l1r
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rcludted." (Emphasis added.) The presumption as to
coHt of doing business in the Utah statute now before the
comt lias been shO"wn by the facts of this case to be a
eonclnsi\'C presumption and not rebuttable.
At page 38 of its brief, intervenor-appellant cites
Jfrlntire \'. Bora/sky, 39 A. 2d 471 (N.H. 1948) in suppurt of the proposition that the prima facie evidence
of a ,-iola tion pro\'ided in the statute was constitutional.
rrltis case \\'as an aotion for an injunction. At page 472
the court quotes the Ne\\' Hampshire statute which states
that :
'l'he ach·ertisement or sale at less than such cost
"Hhall he prim a facie evidence of a violation of
thi8 chapter."
The statntc also provic1es for a 6% markup to cover the
cost of doing husiuess in the absence of proof of a lesser
C'ost.

111 commenting npon the prima facie evidence pro1·i8iou of the statute, which, it should be noted, is not contained in the Utah statute, the court stated:
TJia,t part of Section 2 pro,:iding that advertisements or sale below cost are prirna facie evidence of a violatiou of the Act is also attacked.
8 i1u·c 1w coucl usirc presumption of guilt is created, \Vig-more see8 no constitutional problem. 4
\Vig. E''· 2d Ed. §1356. So long as there is a ratio 11al co1111ection bPiiccen the fact to be proved
a11d the fact presumed, the statute is valid. Mcintire v. Borofsky, supra, at 473.
'I1hc prinw facic evidence statutes which intervenorap1w1lant continues to cite as supporting cases are not
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the same as the 6% presumptiou as to cost of doing business provided in the Utah staitnte. '11 h(~ Utah statute contains no prima facie evideuce provision. Defendant is
arguing against the conclusiveness of the 6% presumption. Therefore, the cases relaiting to pri1na f acie evidence provisions of statutes are inapposite. It should be
noted that in all of these cases 6ted by appellants on
prima facie question, the statute also contains a presumption such as contained in the Utah staitute. With respect
to the prim a f acie provision of the New Hampshire statute, the Mcintire court goes on to state that in New
Hampshire prima facie evidence as used means only evidence to be considered by the jury. An absence of
other evidence does not compel a verdict of guilty. The
court states, "In view of the limited effect give11 to prima
f acie evidence in this jurisdiction, we cannot say that
its application to unfair competition is unreasonable.''
Since the New Hampshire courts have construed prim a
f acie evidence provisions very narrowly and since under
New Hampshire law failure to rebut a prima fa.cie case
does not mean guilt and also si11ce Utah statute contains
no prima facie provision but only a 6% presumption as
to cost of doing business also contained in the other
statutes, it would appear that these cases involving
prima facie provisions are not applicable at all to the
instant ca~e.
Based upon the construction of the above cases as
set forth and the distinguishing factors evident in eacli
of these cases, intervenor-appellant's arguments as to
cost seem to be straw men. I11 the firs.t place, the Utah
statute requires an exact computation of cost. No other
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n•a<li11g can rem;onahly be given the 1rnrds "a markup
to <·m·er a prnportionate part of the cost of <loing business, w Ji ich markup, i11 the absence of proof of a lesser
<·ost, shall be six percent .... " But, even if plaintiff's
arg-ument as to a reasonableness standard were adopted,
the lower rourt found that requiriug defendants to compute the cost in order to comply with the statute was
1111 rl:'asom1blc aml arhitrary, and constituted unconstitu1io11al price fixi11g. rrhis is truly within the weight of the
eYi<lence presented at the trial. It is significant that none
of the cases cited by intenenor-appellant invoke a sitna tio11 where a trial 1vas had on the merits with evidence
presented as to reasonableness of the standard. All of
these determinations were made at the appellate lenl
and many of the courts, as has been pointed out, indicated their inability to make a determination because
of the lack of facitua1 background. It is also significant
that 110110 of the cases cited by appellants are base<l upon
.~tatutes containing the language "prowwtionatc part"
eoutained in the Utah Act.
1'he argument of defendants in this regard is that
un<kr their merchandising conditions and their bookheping and accounting methods, proportionate costs for
itt>ms sold cannot be determined in many cases prior to
their sale. Here the statute requires a determina,tion of
c•xact cost - pro po rtiouate part of the cost of doing
hnsiuess. The court found that such a requirement is unreasonable and many times impossible. Intervenor-appellan t argues for a reasonable allocation of costs to each
ih•m and states:
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Thus, ascertainment of the cost of any item is no1
only possible, but at the present time is actually
done by Skaggs before the item is priced. Bric:f
of Intervenor-appellant at 19.
It is submitted that interyenor-appe11ants are misconstruing the statute and taking out of context the statements made at the trial and cited on pages 19 and 20 of
its brief. It ·will be seen from the citations to the record made on pages 19 and 20 of intern•nor-appellant 'R
brief that the allocations of cost practiced by Skaggs
and Grand Central are decidedly different. Therefore, on
the ,-ery same item with the very same invoice pricl',
Skaggs and Grand Central can come up with a different
"cost" under the Act. Both defcnda11ts testified that
this was only an average or estimated cost and not a proportionate cost as required b~- the statute. After its
statements as to the a1loration of different items by
Skaggs and Grand Central, intervenor-appellant makes
the follo'.ving statement:

There is 110 allocrntion of office expense or utilities, but it is submitted that such an allocatiou
could he made on some reasonable basis without
undue difficulty or expense.
There is no foundation in tl1e reconl for such a statement, there "-as no evidence introduced at the trial that
such was the case. Intervenor-appellant has fabricated
this suppo(>ed evidence from whole cloth. In fact, the
opposite was found. The trial court found that such allocations could not be reasonably made by the defendants.
It will be seen from the transcript and the record in thi~
case that such a finding was amply supported hy the eridence and cannot he overturne<l by this court.
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'l'he quotations from :\Ir. Hayward of defendant,
Grand Central, a11d :\Ir. Sinclair of defendant, Skaggs,
as to their accounting procedure set forth on pages 20
and 21 of intervenor-appellant's brief, do nothing but
support defendants' case. Both 1\fr. Hayward and Mr. Sinclair give as one reaRon for their failure to allocate many
of the costs to the merchandise the fact that such allocatio11 would he impractical and unreasonable. Both admitted that such allocation might not be impossible. It
is submitted that there is very little in this world ·which
is impossible. The Utah Act, howeyer, requires an exact or proportionate allocation of the costs of doing busineRs and the standard, as set forth by the cases cited in
internnor-appel1ant 's brief, is not one of "possibility."
'rlie standard contendecl by intervenor-appellant is of
reasonability and the court, in the instant case, found
that the Utah statute requiring, as it does, the allocation of proportionate cost to particular items was unreas01rnblc. On page 21 of its brief, intervenor-appellant
states:
'l'here is absolutely no basis in the evidence for
the apparent conclusion that further refinement
of accounting procedures used by either of the def ernlants would he or is an impossible or even an
impractical alternative.

lt is submitted that the following references to the
transcript do, in fact, provide ample evidence for the
finding that this refinement would be unreasonable, that
heing the standard rather than impossibility or impracticalitv. (R. 106, 111, 115, 116, 118-19.) Since the allor·ation of costs as requirecl by the statute is unreasonable,
and crea.tes in fact an irrehuttablc presumption that the
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"proportionate part'' of a retailer's cost of doing bnsiness is 6%, the statute in fact fixes prices at invoice
price plus 6%, and c011travene 's Article XII, Section
20 of the Utah Constitution.
A comparison of the 6% presumption to the 10%
standard deduction of the federal and state income tax
laws is completely inappropriate. See discussion at
pages 46-47, supra. The altemative to the 10% standard
deduction under the income tax laws is computable by
after-the-fact accounting methods. No taxpayer is required to predict in advance what his deductions will be
and allocate them to specific items of merchandise. However, the 6% presumption creatrcl by the Utah Unfair
Practices Ac1t requires cost accounting in advance of
sales. It requires the merchant to predict in advance
what his "cost of doing business" is and then allocates
this cost to the various items of merchandise which he
sells. It is submitted that after such merchandise is
sold, for instance at year's end, a merchant could, by
after-the-fact accounting methods, allocate a fairly accurate cost to the items of merchandise which he has sold.
It is therefore submittell that the legislature did not aid
the merchant by the use of the 6% presumption and even
if it were intended to aid the merchant, it does not in
fact aid the merchant. The court is correct in its finding th~t the 6j1c) presumption leaves no alternative and
m fact becomes a conclusive presumption of the cost
of doing business, and m1coustitutiona1ly fixes pricet:.
Respondents are uot, as alleged hy intervenor-appellants, seeking to have their cost accounting done for
them by someone else. Respomlents assert, and the court
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so held, that the 81atute is unworkable. They cannot allocate their costs to the items sold and hence cannot comply
\\'ith the statute.
POIN'r 4
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT
"COST TO THE RETAILER" BE THE
"COS'l' ... TO THE RETAILER WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF
THE SALE, OR DATE OF OFFERING FOR
RA LE" AND THAT "REPLACEMENT
COST" BE THE PRICE AT WHICH MERCHANDISE SOLD OR OFFERED FOR SALE
COULD BE BOUGHT "AT ANY TIME WITHIN THIRrry DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF
'l'HE SALE, OR DATE UPON WHICH IT IS
OFFERED FOR SALE" DISCRIMINATES
AGAINsrr A LARGE VOLUME RETAILER
SUCH AS DEFENDANT AND DEPRIVES
rr OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND DENIES IT EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LA"\V. FURTHER,
SAID PROVISIONS ARE VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS AND UNREASONABLE AND PLACE
UNREA80NABLE BURDENS UPON DEFENDANTS.
Large volnme retailing operations such as defendauts are able to exist in today's competitive world beeause of their efficiency. One area in which they are able
to t•eonomize is in their purchasing departments. As
siatecl in the tesrf:imony of l\fr. Keith Warshaw, the perl'Oll in charge of purchasing for defendant, Grand Central has seYeral different methods of buying, depending
npon the particular merchandise.
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\Vith respect to much of the merchandise purchased
by Grauel Central, the testimony is tliat it is purchased
far in advance of the sale date. An example is given of
Christmas merchandise. ::\Ir. vVarshaw testified that
Christmas merchandise may be bought as far as six
months in advance. As a result of this early buying, defendant receives substantial discounts. The testimony
explains that one of the reasons for these discounts is
that early buys such as this enable manufacturers to keep
their plants in opera,tion the year around. Mr. Warshaw
also testified that if he were to run out of some of this
merchandise purchased at an early date and have to restock it near Christmastime, the price would be substantially higher due to the loss of the early buying discount,
possibly a volume discount, and freight factor. On these
early buys where large quantity is bought, the freight
would be substantially reduced on a p€r-item hasis.
Therefore, the testimony is that whenever possible, defendant Grand Central buys early and buys in volume.
The statute, by requiring that cost be determined
\Yithin thirty days prior to the datP of sale or the date
of offering for sale, scnrely tliscriminatcs against defendants in that it neutralizes this ability they lrnn~ to
buy early and to buy in volume. If Grauel Central were
to purchase Christmas wrapping paper six months before
Christmas on an early-buy program, under the statute
m1y of this wrapping paper sold on Chris,tmas En would
have to be sold based upon a theoretical replacement cost
on November 24. The testimony in the record irn1icates
that the cost on N ovemher 24 would be substantially
greater than the cos't actually paid for the merchandise.

.
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H(•J1Cl', the statutt" is reqmnng Grand Central to purchase 011 the same basis that the small corner grocery
store woul<l pnrchase, where this grocer cannot, due to
liis \·olume, take adnrntage of early buying or volume
buying. "BJarly buying and volume buying are legitimate
lrnsi]l(•ss practices. By denying defendant the benefit
uf these legitimate husiHess practices and forcing it to
set its prices at the prices of its less efficient competitors,
tl1e .A C't in fact discriminates against defendants and denies them equal protection of the law. See Cohen v. Frey
& 8011, Inc., 80 A.2d 267 (l\Icl. 1951). In taking from defrn(lm1ts this advantage which they are able to gain
tlirough their efficiency and size, the statute is taking
from the defendants their property without due process
of law, aml violates equal protection of the law. Cohen v.
Frey, s111Jra; Serrer v. Cigarrttr Sen-ice Co., 76 N.E.
2d 91 (Ohio 1947). See State v. Wender, 141 S.E. 2d
:riD CW. Va. 1965).
The tl•stimou)· also indicates that on certain occasiom; def endnnt Grand Central has advertised specials.
As RPt forth in the stipulation, Grand Central purchased
tmke:n:; 011 NowmlJcr 8, 1065, at $.33V~ per pound. Thereaftc•r, on Decemlwr 17, 1965, mor ethall thirty days after
Uw original pure base, clef endant purchased additional
t mke)·s at an invoice cost of $.37% per pound. On DeCC'mhc•r ] 7, 1965, and thereafter, defendant had in stock
('Ommiuglecl frozen tom turkeys purchased on NovemliPr 8, 1965, at $.33V~ per pound and on December 17,
1963, at $.37V~ per pound. These commingled turkeys were
~nli;,;0qneJ1tly sold b;· defendant on and after December
17, 1%3, for $.37 per pound. Under the Act, this was a
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violation because the turkeys purchased on November
8, were sold more than thirty days after purchase. 'l1herefore, the ''cost to the retailer'' Rhonld ha;-e been determined upon the basis of replacement cost or a theoretical
replacement cost. If Grand Central had advertised a
special beginning December 7, and running through
ChriS'tmas, on turkeys based upon the lower original
cost, under the statute, after December 8 it would haYc
to raise the price even though it was still selling the initially-purchased turkeys. Such a requirement places an
unreasonable burden upon defendant to keep its mnchandise segregated so that it knows when it purchased
each item. U also penalizes defendant in that it does not
allow it to take advantage of its earlier price and sell
for a correspondingly lower price. In attempting through
this method to stabilize prices, the Act in fact discriminates against the more efficient refailer and promotes the
inefficient retailer.
This thirty-day pricing requirement is arbitrary,
unreasonably discriminatory and has no rele\-ance to
the purpose of this statute. See State v. Mason, 78 P.2d
920 (Utah 1938). Statutory discriminations such as this
resulting in limitations upon the defendant's property
rights, are valid only if they have a reasonable relationEhip to the purpose of the Act. See State v. Mason,
supra. The legislative policy of the Act and its purpose
as stated in Section 13-5-17, Utah Code Annotated (Repl.
vol. 1962), is "to safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest compc60

tion is destroyed or prevented.'' The thirty-day requirement does not in any ~way foster and encourage competition, nor docs it 11rohibit unfair and discriminatory
practices. In fact, what it does is prohibit fair and efficieut retailing. It cannot be argued that the prevention
of efficient retailing helps to preserve honest competition. As stated before, all this does is promote inefficiency and tend to stabilize the retailing market on the
level of the more inefficient retailer. This cannot be said
to "safeguard the public." Utah Code Ann. §13-5-17
(Hepl. YOl. 1962).
Further, it should be noted that by placing the thirty-day restriction in the definition of replacement cost
&ml inYoice cost, the sfatute creates a vague, ambiguous
and unenforceable standard placing an unreasonable
lmrden on the retail merchant. See discussio~ page 77,
infra. In a large \'Olume retailing operation such as that
of defendant, it is virtually impossible for defendant to
keep track of his stock so as to know whe.ther or not he
is selliug it within the thirty-day period. The Act would
se<'m to require that defendant check his shelves every
day to make sure that not one bottle of aspirin or one can
of hair spray is being sold (or offered for sale) more
than thirty days after its purchase based upon the purehase price. Then, after having found his bottle of aspirin or can of hair spray on the shelf which was purehase<l more than thirty days before its sale date (or
offer for sale) he would have to adjust the price. There
arises then the possibility that he could have thirty different prices on the same item of merchandise. That is
to say if purchases of aspirin or hair spray were made
61

each da)· of the mouth, then tl1en•nfh'r th<' 011es 110t sold
prior to the expiratiou of the thirty-day period would
haYe to he re-mark0<1. l-fr11ee, e\·01·y day certain of tlw
items \rnuld be re-marked, hasecl upon the flucrt:uati11g
price of the commoditY.
. As was stated ill the testimom.
of ::\Ir. Keith vVarshaw, items such as hair spray fluctuate in price greatly. (R. G3) To keep track of thes('
prices in order to comply with the Act would he impossible. The Act also becomes Yague and ambiguous in its
determirn1tion and use of the thirty-day period in that it
clocs not say \\'hose price the replacement price shall he
As stated in the testimony of ::\fr. Keith ·warshaw, there
are numerous places where one can obtain hair spray.
(R. 63-64) Renee•, it cannot lle dt>termined whether the
theoretical replacement price is to he based upon the
price at which the rntailer eol1lcl haYc l10ught this saml'
commodity from the same supplil•r, from a (lifferent supplier, from a wl1olesaler, from a johlwr or eYen as a
job her.
In its application, this sedion of the statute becomes
so ,-ague and amliigucms and pl aces such a lmrd0n upmt
the merchant tlrnt it cnnllot he 11ph0lcl as eonstitutio11al.
See State PX rel. English Y. R11back, 281 N.·w. 607 (Neb.
1038); Henrie \T. Rocky Jltn. Parkiug Corp., 202 P.2d 727
(Utah 1949). The trial court in the case at bar concluded that:
The dcfi11iti011 of th0 term ''replacement eos·t"
in the Ad is yagne, nmhignons and unenforceable
and places au um·eas011al)le bnnl0n on the retail
mcrclia11t ill dl'krminiug whether or not his price
for a particular item of merchandise is or is 110!
i11 Yiolation of the Aet. '' (R. 44)
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For the proposition that the term" replacement cost"
may lw easily asC'ertainecl hy merely keeping abreast of
the current market aml is not violative of standards of
,·ag·ueness, intervenor-appellant cites Hill v. Kusy, 35
~.~W. 2d 394 (Neh. 1949). This case arose when plaintiff filed for a declaratory judgment and an injunction
against defendant for violating the Sale-Below-Cost Act.
Plaintiffs also asked for damages and for equitable re!irf. Defe11dant demurred on the ground that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action against him. Tlw trial court oYerruled the dellllllTer and gave the defendant time to further plead. Defell<lant refused to further uplead and the trial court
(lcer0e<l the Act was not m1constitutiona1. The case cit0d
h>· ddernlant did not arise upon a trial on the merits. It
earn(' up on a demurrer. The trial court did not have
hefor0 it the f;:wts or circumstances which the lower court
in the irn;fant case had. The following quote appears on
!>ag(' ,)9( of the Hill case, and should be noted with rese1wet to the proposition for which intenenor-appellant
l'ites the case:

It fur1ther is urged that there is a lack of clarity,
\\·liich renclers the act void, in the meaning of the
terms ust'd in the act, such as ''replacement cost,''
"proportionate part of the cost of doing busi11ess'' and ''unfairlv diverting trade from a competitor.'' The ten~s may present difficulties in
npplication 1rhe11 the s11fficiency of evidence in
fact questions is presented. Mere difficuilty of appliea ti on in the process of li tiga ti on is .not enoug?
to l'llable a court to say that a statute is u11conshtutio11al. (Emphasis added.)
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In the insitant case, the trial court had ample evidence before it to sustain its findings and conclusions
that the "cost" provisions of the Utah Act were uncoustitutional. These findings should be upheld 011 thi~
appeal.
POINT 5
THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF CORT,
BY PERMITTING THE DEDUCTION OF
TRADE DISCOUNTS AND EXCLUDING THJi;
DEDUCTION OF CASH DISCOUNTS, IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY YAGUE AND AMBIGlTOUS AND DISCR11\1INATES -WITHOUT
REASON B E rr-w E E N TYPES OF DISCOUN'l18.
Classifications, in order to be valid, must he reaso11a ble. :J\fr. Justice -Wolfe, in the case of State v. 1Vlaso11,
78 P.2d 920 (Utah 1938), very ahl~v sets out the test:
Of course, every legislative act is in one
sense discriminaton'. The Legislature cannot legislate as to all persons or all subject matters. It
is inclusive as to some class or group and as to
some human relatonships, transactions, or functions and exclusive as to the remainder. For that
reason, to he unconstitutional the discrimination
must he unreasonable or arbitrary. A classification is- never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so long as there is
some basis for the differention between the classes for subject matters included as compared to
those excluded from its operation, provided the
differention l1Pars a reasonable relation to the
purposes to be acconiz)lished by tlze art. State'·
Mason, s1111ra at 923. (Emphasis added.)
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It is also clear that statutes proscribing otherwise leg;itirnnte co11dnet must he snfficienfly clear so as to inform
the possihle \'iolator of a violation. In State v. Packard,
2:>0 P.2d 361 (Utah 1952), ~Ir. Justice Crockett se t forth
the test nry clearly:
Concerni11g the ques,tion of uncertainty or
vagueness of statutes, the authorities seem to be
in accord that the test a statute must meet to be
valid is: It must he sufficiently definite (a) to
iuform persons of ordinary intelligence, who
would he law abiding, what their conduct must be
to conform to its requirements; (b) to advise
a def end ant accused of violating it just wha,t constitutes the offense with which he is charged, and
( c) to he susceptible of uniform interpretation
and application by those charged with responsibility of applying and enforcing it. State v. Packard, s111Jra, at 564. (Emphasis added.)
1

rrhe sfatnte involved in the instant case violates
both of these above-mentioned rules in thart it unreasonnhi>' aml arbitrarily excludes "discounts for cash" from
11H' fa vorahle treatment given "all trade discounts" in
the definition of cost to the retailer. The Act is also unc011stitio11ally vague and ambiguous in that it fails to
nrlc'qua tely define the terms "trade discounts" and "cash
cfo;rouuts.''
The reconl in this case is replete with references to
tl1c> different types of discounts obtained by defendants,
1'.,rJ. R. 68-69, 72-73, 84, 90-91. Some of these discounts
were described by Keith Warshaw as early booking,
warehouse, anticipation, advertising, free goods, and
l'O]ume discounts. (R. 68-69) In many cases, defendants
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also receive a discount for early payment. Iu order to be'
able to de<luet a discount from the selling price of an
item, defendants must first dPtcrminc whether this discount is a trade discount or cash discount. \Vith no defii11i1tio11al standards placed in the Act, this places upon
defendant a heavy burden. \Vhether defendants can legally deduct from its "cost" the early booking cliscount,
the warehouse discount, the anticipation discount, the
advertising discount, the free goods discount or the volume discount mus{ in the final analysis be determined by
a court. In taking any of these discounts as a deduction on its "cost," a retailer is acting at its peril for at a
later date any one of these discounts could be cla,ssed as
a ''cash discount'' and hence disallowed. Disallowance
of the discount could then subject the retailer to liabilities and prosecution under the Act for a sale below cost.
This latent ambiguity containecl in the terms "trade discount'' and ''discounts for cash'' places an unreasonable burden upon defendant. Under the standards set
forth in State v. Packard, supra, this statute must he drdared unconstitution. It is not sufficiently definite so as
to inform a person of ordinary intelligence, who would
be law abiding, what his conduct should be in order to
conform to its requirements. It would take a person with
a divine intelligence in order to determine what the Legislature intended by the terms used in the statute. Nor
is the statute sufficiently definite so as to advise a defendant accused of violating it with what he is charged.
If defendants were to take, for instance, their anticipation discount as a trade discount and hence deduct it
from their ''cost,'' they could he prosecuted under the
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;\ct for a criminal violatio11 and for ci\'il penalties if it
\\'ere later determined that this anticipation discount is
really a cash discount. The same would he true with any
of the other discounts mentioned. Further, the statute
is not susceptible of a uniform interpretation and applicatio11 by those charged with the responsibility of enforcing and applying it. Each retailer, by his type and
1'olume of business, receives many different types of disconnh;. These discounts are variously enumera:ted.
::vr any of the discounts, though called by a different name,
are essentially the same. Uniform applicaition and interpretation of this section would require regulations
clearly setting forth each of the allowable discounts and
each of the non-allowable discounts. Due to the very natme of the retailing business, this would be practically
impossible. The types and kinds of discounts vary with
the t,\'pe of business involved. The vagueness of the
standard creates practical impossibility with respect to
t•nforcement.

Under present retail marketing methods, where
many types and kinds of discounrts are received and
1rl1cr0 such discounts vary greatly between different
d11 sses of businesses and different sizes of businesses,
there iR a hsol utelv no basis for differentiation between
"trade discounts" and "discounts for cash." Neither
does this cliff0rentiation bear any reasonable relation to
the pnrpose of the Act. If what is meant by the statutory
term ''discount for cash'' is the discount many suppliers
and manufacturers give to the retailer who pays prior
to the tenth of the month, there is absolutely no reason
for distinguishing this type of discount from a discount
67

received due to volume buyi11g or one received due to
early buying. All of these discounts are available to the
merchant who can qualify for them. Some merchants
are in a position to buy early. Some merchants are in a
position to buy in large volume. Other merchants may
be in a position to pay early. One merchant may be in
a position to take advantage of all of these discounts
while another merchant might be able to take advantage of only one. To distinguish between the discounts
arbitrarily and unreasonably distinguishes between different types of merchandising operations. Cf. Cohen "·
Frey & Son, Inc., 80 A.2d 267 (:Md. 1951 ). Economical!~·
there is no basis foT such distinction since all of the
discounts grant an equal advantage to the peTson who
can take advantage of them and an equal disadvantage to
the person who is unble to take advantage of them. There
is nothing inherently different about discounts for
prompt payment and discounts for volume or for early
buying. They all amount to preferential treatment for
particular purposes. The statutory discrimination between these types of discounts is unreasonable and arbi.
trary in including discounts labeled trade discounts and
excluding discounts labeled discounts for cash. See State
v. Mason, 78 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1938).
Another requirement of State v. Ma.son is tha,t the
differentiation must bear a reasonable relation to the
purposes to be accomplished by the Act. As sitated in
Section 13-5-17 of the Act, the purpose of the Legislature
in passing the Act was to ''safeguard the public against
the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster
and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair and
68

disaiminatory practices by which fair and honest com1wtition is destroyed or prevented.'' Discriminiating between ''trade discounts'' and ''discounts for cash'' can
be sho\vn to bear no reasonable relation to this stated
purpose of the Act. If a cash discount would be inimical
to the purposes and policy of the Act, so would be a trade
discount, since bo,th serve exactly the same function.
The trial court in the case at bar concluded that "the
statutory definition of cost by permitting the deduction
of trade discounts and excluding the deduction of cash
(liscounts is ambiguous and discriminates without reason between type·s of discounts." (R. 44) This conclusion
of the court is amply supported by the evidence adduced
at the trial and by simple logic.
POINT 6
rrHE ACT IS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN PROHIBITING RALES BELOW COST AS DE~'INED IN THE ACT -WHERE THE ONLY
[NTENT OF A RETAILER IN PRICING THE
ITEl\IS BELOW COST IS TO INDUCE CUS'l'Ol\1ERS OF THAT RETAILER TO PURCHASE 0 THE R MERCHANDISE FROM
THA'l' RETAILER, AND HENCE IS IN VIOLA'l'ION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND
ARTICLI1J XII, §20 OF THE UTAH CONSTITU'l'ION.
There is ample evidence in the transcript of the trial
that defendant Grand Central has a fairly stable clientele. Much of the testimony of the witnesses for the def ense was to the, effect that its pricing policies were de-
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veloped with the thought in mind of protecting its established clientele, while of course increasing it ·where possible. (R. 53-55) Section 13-5-7 of the Sale-Below-Cost
Act in snbsecti(rn (a) prnYidt>s:

It is her0h>- declared that an>· ach·ertising, offer

to sell, or sale of any merchandise, either by retailers or wholesalers, at less than cost as defowd
in this act with the i11te11t a11d 7mrpnse of i11d11cinq
the purchase of ot71er 111ercha11dise or of unfnirlY
diYerti11g trade from a competitor or otherwis;,
iniuri11g a eompetitor impairs and prevents fair
competitio11, injures public w0lfare, is unfair comp<•tition contrary to pnlJlic poliC')" and the policy of
this act and is declared to he in ,-iolation of
this act.
rrhe italicized portion of the aliove-cited statute presr11(,
the problem discussed in this Point. The Act would seem
to prohibit a sale below cost with the intent and purpose
of inducing the purchase of other merchandise regardle~s
of the unfairness or fairness of the transaction and also
regardless of who made the purchase or what was purchased. This pnn-ision would seem to prohibit such a
sale even if the sale \YNe for the sole purpose of inducing a regular customer of defendant to purchasr
other merchandise which a competitor did not eYen srll.
The Act would se<>m to make no requirement that it he
shown that such a transaction in any \my harme<l a
competitor of defendant or took from the competitor an~·
business. -As distinguished from the phrase which prohibits unfairly diverting trade from a competitor, or injuring a competitor, the above-italicized portion of the
Act prohibits conduct which is in 110 way shown to hann
a competitor. Absent the element of harm to a com70

1wtitor, there would be no harm to competition. Since
there is no harm to competition, this provision is not
reasouahly related to the purpose of the Act and is hence
unconstitutional. See State v. Mason, 78 P.2d 920
(Utah 1938).
if the Act were interpreted to read that the
sale l 1elow cost with the intent and purpose of inducing
the purchase of other merchandise also required a showing of diverting trade from another merchant, the statute
would still he unconstitutional. In prohibiting a sale
\rith the intent and purpose of inducing the purchase of
11tlwr merchandise \\'hile not prohibiting a like sale without 1!tis intent and purpose, the statute sets up a classification. As set forth in State v. Maso11, supra, a classilicntion, in order to be deemed reasonable, must contain some basis for the cliffrrentiation and must be rea'onably related to the purposes of the Act. Judicial noticl' rnn he taken of the fad that all competitors are in
ln1si11ess with the intent and purpose of inducing the purrfou.;p of m<!rchandise. Inherent in the idea of competition is the fact that if one competitor makes a sale, another competitor may lose a sale. Hence, the very es'-'<'11r•11ec• of our eompetitiYe system is that each participant is out to get all that he can get by fair means. In
liO opcrntiug, one of the chief goals of the competitor is
to <fo'ert lmsiness a\nly from his competitors. There is
Hotl1iu.~ i11hen·ntly had about this goal - this is perfr>ctl~, h>gitimate business and is amply supported by the
~Kven

T'.tnl1 ( 1 onstitutio11.
Article X1 r, Section :W of the Utah Constitution expresses the overriding co11cern of the members of the
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Constitutional C011\'ention with the idea of frel' and untrammeled competition. This particular section of the
Constitution was enacted specifically to promote and enforce the idea of free competition. The Sale-Below-Cost
Act was supposedly enacted in furtherance of this constitutional policly. I\ othing in the italicized portion of
the above-cited statute can be said to promote competition. The co11duet prohibited in this section is in fact the
very essence of competition. In prohibiting such conduct, the statute goes contrary to the specific policy of
the Utah Constitution.

It should be noted that the italicized portion of the
above-quoted statute should be read Rlong with its cfo,_
junctiYe phrase. Since the second phrase ''or of unfairly di'»erting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring a competitor" is written in the disjunctive, it
must he read that way. By placing an "or" before
the second phrase, the obvious purpose of the Legislatme
was to differentiate between the first and the second
phrases. The second phrase requires Rn i11tent to treat
unfairly or injure a competitor. The requirement of
i11tcnt to injure provides the necessary criminal intent
to support the criminal stafote. Such a requirement is
strictly in line ·with the policy of Article XII, Seetion 20
of the Utah Constitution, and the policy set out in Section 13-5-17 of the Sale-Below-Cost Act. Statutes similar to the above-italicized portio11 of the Utah Act haw
lwen held unconstitutional because they had no requirement of criminal i~1tent. ~':Uate ex rel. Anderson v. Flemill!J
Co., 339 P.2d 12 (Kan. El59); State v. Packard-BambPrger & ('o., 8 A.2cl 291 (N. J. 1939); Englebrecht v. Day.

~ll'\ P .2<1 338 (Okla. 19-±9). Since it cannot be read as in-

rl ncl i ng the rc·quircments of unfairness or injury, this portion of the rtah Act must he held to be unconstitutional
a~ a viola ti on of due process under the Federal Constitut io11, aml Article XII. Section 20 of the Utah Consitituti011. 8ee Fairmont Crramery Co. v. J1i11nesota, 274 U.S.
1 ( 1927).

Siguificant at this point is the enforcement procedure of the Utah Trade Commission "·ith respect to this
proYision of the Act. :Jir. J. Gonlon Browning, Execufr;e Secretar:· of the l 1 tah State Trade Commission, testifiecl with respect to the enforcement procedures of the
Trnde Commission. The follmving dialogue between Mr.
Brom1in!;· and ~Ir. \Valdo is significant:
Q. ( hy ~Ir. \Valdo) Let's take the ,·iolation that is
alleged in the complaint here of selling Bayer
Aspirin at less than cost. How do you determine the other, the more or less thing of the
1·iolatio11, but the intent element of the violation f vYha t is your procedure in determining
that aspect~
~\. Now as to the monopoly, it is my understanding that the word "monopy" has been taken
out. I am just not quite Q. \Vell, there are two elements involved in the
1·iolatio11, is that not so?
A. Right.
Q. One you haYe to sell below cost, and second
you l~ave to have one of these intents that is
~leemed unlawful bv the Act. Now, what I am
asking you is how. you determine the intent
that is cle0med unlawful by the Act.
A. Well, the fact that there is a legal price would
indicate to me that it could be intended, if it is
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below the legal price, and the person knows
it is below the legal price. I would have to
think that this in my mirnl would he intention.
(R. 124-125)
From the foregoing quote it will be observed that
in enforcing this Act the Trade Commission in fact has
a presumption of intent from the sale below cost. 'l'here
is no statutory presumption provided for this purpose.
Hence, the Trade Commission not only does not require
any actual showing of unfairness or injury to a competitor, but assumes or presumes intent from the fad
that a sale was shown to be below cost. Such a presumption of intent to induce the purchase of other merchandise, along with the fact that thi8 phrase cannot be read
in conjunction with the phrase providing for unfair or injurious treatment to a competitor, renders the italicized
phrase in the above-quoted statute completely unconstitutional and contra the policy of the Act itself.
Except for the stipulation of the parties as it relat•''
to Count I of the Complaint, there is no evide11ce whatsoever in the record in the instant case that defendants
had any intent or purpose to unfairly divert trade from
a competitor or o·therwise injure a competitor. There i.'
evidence to support the proposition that defendants did
have an intent and purpose to induce the purchase of
O'ther ·merchandise. Intervenor-appellant argues that
proof of an intent to gain business from a competitor j-,
proof of an intent to injure the competitor. In support
of this proposition, it cites La11ndry Operating Company
Y. Spaldiug £a,undry & Dry Clcani11g Compmzy, 383 S.W.
2d 364 (Ky. 1964). The plni11tiff i11 that case was ap74

peal from a summary judgment entered against it on the
ha sis of pretrial depositions, the opening statement of
r·mms01, and the tc>stimony of its president and chief
1rituess. It was agreed that no further additional faots
in support of the complaint would have have been dewloped iu the course of the trial. At the trial a summar~· judgment dismissing the complaint was granted on
the basis that there was not sufficient evidence to support
a finding that defernlant had intended to injure competitors and destroy competition. This dismissal was renrsed on appeal. Upon thorough analysis of the extensin' quote from the appellate opinion set out by interYenor-appellant at page 39 of its brief, it will be seen that
tlir theory of the court in that case was unsound. In
tliat case, the defendant had called on customers of its
wmpetitor laundry company and offered them two weeks'
free sen-ice if they would try its service. By this method the competitors' customers were lured to defendant. The court held that in calling upon customers of
its competitor and offering this free service, defendant
k11e"· or should have known tlia.t he was unfairly diverting trade from his competitors. It is submitted that
thesp facts do not sustain the holding of the court. Even
if the facts do sustain the holding, the facts were much
more gross than any invoked in the instant case. In
110 part of the instant case were either of the defendants
kno"·ingly soliciting particular customers of competitors. All they were doing was trying to expand their
l1wu hnsi11ess. The court stated in Laundry Operating
ro., "vVe do not suggesit that a purpose to divert or
r·apture a competitor's business is wrong or unethical. It
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is perfectly legitimate so long as it is not carried out
unfairly." Laundry Operating Co. v. Spalding Laundry
& Dry Cleaning Co., supra at 3G6. The whole essence of
the case was that it was not too difficult to infer intent ,
from the actions of defendant. That is, intent to injure its
competitors, when it went right out aml solicirted specific customers ·which it knew it would be taking from
competitors. Nothing approaching this conduct occurred
in the case now before the court.

Even if a presumption of intent was explicitly provided under the Utah Act, such a prnsumption ·would he
unconstitutional, under cases cited by appellant and cases
cited herein a:t 72 supra. On page 34 of its brief, intervenor-appellant cites Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp 70 (D. Minn. 1938).
Intervenor-appellant cites this case for the proposition that, ''although the court held the statute in question unconstitutional on grounds which clo 11ot apply to
the instant case, the court specifically held that the
legislature may properly presume that the markup ma)·
be fL'\:ed at 10% in the absence of a showing of a lesser
markup." Brief of Intervenor-App(~llant 34. True, the
the legislature may indulge in such a presumption umlt>r
certain conditions. However, this statemeut by intervenor-appellant is expressly contrary to the holding of
this case.. The case, expressly holds that the 10% presumption in the absence of proof of a lesser cost is unconstitutional. In this regard, the court states:
With respect to the presumption created by the
sixth paragraph of seetion 3 of part 2, we haw
already pointed out that, in our opinion, the fact
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of guilty i11te11t is not reasonably to be inferred
from the fact of sale at less than 10% per cent [sic]
abore thp, cost of the goods. No doubt, the presumption of guilt would be helpful to the sfate in
the prosecution of alleged violators of the statute,
but it would be as hurtful to the accused as it
would be helpful to the accusor. Intent is something which is easily asserted and hard to disprove. To ca~c;t upon a merchant who has sold
goods at less than 10% per cent [sic] above their
cost, the burden of establishing that the sale was
not made with an 1:nte-nt to injure competitors or
destroy competition, subjects him to unreasonable
hardship. We think the disadvantage to him of the
presumption of guilt should be regarded as out\Veighing the advantage of the presumption to
the state. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervi1t, supra, at 82. (Emplia.sis added.)
POINT 7
TH.HJ T~JRl\IS "UNFAIRLY DIVERTING
TRADE jj'ROl\f A COMPETITOR," "INJURING A COMP:B"JTITOR," and "LEGAL PRICES
01'-, A COMPETITOR" AS USED IN THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS AND DO
N(Yr SUFFICIENTLY WARN THE POTENTIAL VIOLATOR OF THE PROHIBITED
ACTS AS CONSTRUED AND APPLIED BY
THE TRADE COMMISSION.
Thti Uuifrd States Supreme Court has held that:
... a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague thait men of
common intelligence must necessarily t,'lless at its
meaning and differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law. Connally
v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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The standard of definiteness required by the Utah
court in order to sustain tlw validity of a statute owr
a charge of void for vagueness is adequately set forth
by l\Ir. Justice Crockett in the case of State v. Packard,
250 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952). In thait case, Russell Packard
was convicted of failing to register with the Industrial
Commission before commencing employment. Conviction
was had under a Utah statute requiring '' eYery person
before commenciug employment with a person, firm or
corpora.tion whose employees are out on a labor strike
called by a national recog11ized 1111ion to register with thr
Industrial Commission of Utah." Section 49-1-29, Utah
Code Ann. (1943). (Emphasis added.) Defendant contended that this statute was void because it was Yagne
and uncertain. The phase relied upon iu the argume11t
for vagueness was the phrase "called by a national reeognized union." Defendant argued that these terms ·were
not susceptible of definition sufficient to ·warn defendall!
of the possible consequences of his action.
With respect to the questio11 of uncertainty nrn1
vagueness of statutes, the con rt set down some staudards
which should be applied in the case at bar. The court hP1<1
that a statute, in order to he 1·alicl, must be sufficiently
definite.
" (a) to inform persons of ordiua ry intelligence,
who would be law abiding, what their conduct
must be to conform to its requirements; (b) to advise a defendant accused of violating it just what
constitutes the offense with which he is charged,
and (c) to be susceptible of unform interpretatioll
and applicatiou by those charged ·with responsibility of applying a ud enforcing it." State '"
Packard, supra. at 564.
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ln applying these starnlards to the wording of the statute
irnrolved in the Packard case, the court held that the
terms ''a national recognized union'' injected such uncertai11ty into the statute a.s to render it void for vagueness.
'l'he court held that the problem with the terms as used
in the statute was that one could not ascertain who wa.s
to recognize the union, if it was to be recognized, whether
it was to be recognized by the public generally, by other
lahor organizations, by industrial leaders, by the NLRB
or some other source, or whether the average citizen
liaving heard of the union gaYe it national recognition.
The court went on to state:
There is, of course, no legal standard referred to
in the statute or known to us, by which it may
be determined what a "nationally recognized"
union is. State v. Packard, supra, at 564.
Absent such a standard, the court held the statute unco118ti tutioual. The further pro bl em inherent in this
::;taJtuk, the court held, was that a person of average
iutelligeuce could not conveniently identify which unions
would come within the statute and which unions would
not. 'l1he uncertainties of the statute were such that a
1wrs011 might he ''perplexed to know whether he had to
l'C'gistcr before going to work. Therefore, the statute is
so indefinite and uncertain that it is unconstitutional, as
ruled hy the lower court." State 1'. Packard, supra, at
;)G5.

A similar problem arose in an earlier Utah case,
Henrie\'. Rocky Jlitn. Packing Corp., 202 P.2d 727 (1949).

'I'his opinion was written a.s the result of a rehearing of
the case originally heard and reported in 196 P.2d 487
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(1948). The case i1ffolved the prons1011s of Sectio!l
14-6-:3 of the Utah Code Annotated (1943). That statute
made it a misdemem1or to employ a minor under the age of
18 years "in any place of employment, dangerous or pre.furl icial to the life, health, saf etv or welfare of snch
minor." (Emphasis added.) Young 1\I r. l\fenrie was
killed as a result of possible 11egligrnce on the part of
his employer. The issue of the case was whether the
father of the deceased youth should be able sue hiR
employer for wrongful death or whether thP accident
'Nas under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission
and governed by limitations on liability. The court had,
in a previous case, determined that the question of
whether the Industrial Commission or the court had
jurisdiction was hased upon whether a misdeamenor lrn(l
in fact been committed by the clef endant. If n crime
had been committed, or if decrased was illegally employed, the trial court would haw sol0 jurisdiction. If
he was legally employed, the Commission had exclnsire
jurisdietion. ·whether he ·was legally or illegally rmpoyed depended upon whetlier his place of employmcllt
was ''dangerous or prejudicial'' to health, life or safety
i11 violation of the aboYe-cited statute. The kr)· ·word
in the statute is ''dangerous.'' The court in the H enriP
case held that the term ''<lang0rous,'' being }t comparati,·e term, was too ,·ague and ambiguous to constitute
the standard for a crime>. The court states:
It is a principle too familiar to require cit~
tion of authorit)·, that penal statutes, to be constitutional, must lw clear and definite i11 their terms
so that there mav he kuo·wn exactly what conduct
is proscrih8(]. Henrie Y. Rocky· Mtn. I'acki11r1
('orp., s111Jra, at 729.
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In referring to the term "dangerous,'' the court
l'alleu it an "accordian" term. The problem with the
term was the she:ir difficulty placed upon an employer
to detenninc whether or not his business was "danger011s. ' ' Tlw court goes on to point out that some busi11<·sses arc knffwll to he dangerous. Such are called the
i 11hc·re11tly dangerous buRinesses such as mining, quarrying-, railroadi11g, and manufacturing of explosives and
dangerous chemicals. In such indnstries there would be
110 <louht as to the dangerous nature.
However, any
irnli1stry or any li11e of work can possibly lead to injury
or r1allger. 'l'he court pointed out that there was absol11tel~· no "safe" work if that term were used literally.
Since all businesses were not considered safe and all
linsi110sses were not considen'd dangerous, a burden was
plnced upon the clef enclant of making his own decisions
as to 'idwther his business was dangerous. Such a burll<·n, ihe court held, could uot be placed upon the defendant. The statute placing such a burden upon a potential
d<·i'eH<lallt is so ambiguous and ,·ague as to violate the
collSt it u t io11al standards.
At th is point, it is essential to note that in the
lfe11ric case there was no prosecution for violation of
a criminal statute. This was a ciYil suit for damages.
The court, however considered the criminal statute as
a necC>SRHl)T part of the ci\·il case, since a determination
of whether or not defendant had committed a crime was
essential to the civil case.
'The terms ''unfairly diverting trade from a compditor,'' ''injuring a competitor,'' or ''legal prices of
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a competitor" are just as \'ague, ambiguous and impossible of definition a.s were the terms "national
recognized union'' and ''dangerous'' used iu the abo\'ecited cases.
(A) What is meant by the terms "unfairly diverting
trade from a competitor'''?
This phrase contains not just one but at lea.st three
"accordian" terms. First, the term "unfairlv" should
be considered. This word is definitely a word c011taining '
moral and ethical conotations. Fairness is a product of
the cultural development of any particular society or
sub-society. It is obvious that what is fair to one persou
is not necessarily fair to another. Fairness is also equated
to the equally-undefinable term of justice. People ge11erally feel that they have been dealt with fairly if they
have been dealt with justly. The United States Supreme
Court in the case of United States v. L. ('ohen Grocery
Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) had before it a statute which
made a person liable to criminal penalty if he willfully
made "any unjust or unrea,sonable rate of charge in
handling or dealing in or with any nece,ssities." ln dealing with this statute, the court held that the above-quoted
phrase made the sitatute void for vagueness in violation
of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution in that it did not require an ascertainable standard
of guilt. The term "unfairly" in the statute at bar
suffers from the same i11firmity. It is truly an elastic
term the definition of which is based upon the snh'
jective feeling and the cultural heritagP of the person
making the definition.
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Tlw next portion of this phrase to be considered is
the word "diverting." The very essence of competition
is the di version of business from someone else to oneself.
'ro coueretely define the term "diverting" as used in
the Utah Unfair Practices Act, however, is no easy task.
Ts it a diverting of trade from a competitor to sell to
a regular customer of the seller an item which he might
not ordinarily buy'? Thr proceeding point can be illustrated by a hypothetical: Suppose a customer is in
(lrfendant Grand Central 's store purchasing tobacco
protlucts which are "on sale.'' This customer is a regular customer of the store for tobacco products. However,
on the particular occasion, as he enters the store he
knows he needs some coffee, so in addition to his tobacco
prndncts hr purchases some coffee. Competitor "A"
of Grand Central does not sell coffee. Competitor "B''
sells coffee of a brand different than that sold by Grand
Cc11tral. Comprtitor "C" sells the same brand of coffee
as Grand Central. Has this purchase diverted trade
from competitors "A", "B" or "C"? In order to
rlin•rt from someone, it must be shown that they initially
had this trade. -Which of the above competitors has the
trade? Jn order to have the intent of unfairly diverting
this trncle from a competitor, a defendant would have
to know who i11itially had the trade. How would defendant know who had the trade? Diverting connotes that
the flow at one time was going in one direction and was
later changed to another direction. Webster's 7th New
( 'ollegiate Dictionary defines the term "to di,,ert" as
"to turn in opposite direc,tions," "to turn aside," "to
turn from one course or use to another." All of the
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aforementioned definitions require an existing courne
of action from which the di,Tersion results. Docs tlw
Utah Unfair Practices Act require that a course of
business be shown inn>lving a competitor from whicl 1
the defendant diverted the trade 7 Or, cloes the staitnte
only require that a defendant make a sale and thereby
imply that he must have diverted trade from someonc
else who was not able to make this sale 1 In not further
defining the term "diverting,'' the statute becomes
vague and ambiguous and impossible to administer.
Further in the phrase "unfairly diverting trade from a
competitor" we find the ~word "competitor." Defining
a compe1titor is quite difficult in realit~T because it depends upon the circumstances. \Vhich of the stores
aforementioned, ''A'', '' B' ', or '' C '', are competitors
of defendant? Does def end ant Grand Central, with its
store in Murray, compete with the stores of defendant
Skaggs in Bountiful? Does the Bountiful store of
defendant Skaggs compete with the store of Shopper's
Discount located on 35th South in Salt Lake Cityf Does
the store of def end ant Grand Central in Salt Lake City
compete with the sitore of def eudant Skaggs in Provo 1
Does the store of defendant Grand Central located in
Salt Lake City compete with the store of one of the
members of intervenor-appellant located in Midvale?
The precise definition of this term "competitor" is
required in the statute in several aspects. In the first
place, the statute prohibits unfairly diverting trade from
a competitor; secondly, it prohibits the injuring of a competitor; and thirdly, it grants an exemption for meeting
the legal prices of a competitor. How close mnst two
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stores be in order to be competitors? Must the stores
cany the Rame lirnlHls in order to be competitors? Must
the' stores be tl1e same i:iize in order to be competitors?
Must defendant be aware of the existence of another
store in order to han it as a competitor? None of these
ll ll('stions are answered by the statute.
(B) vVhat is meant by the phrase "injuring a compe1ti tor'' "I
The term competitor has been discussed above.
Therefore, the present discussion will be concerned with
the tPrm "injuring." This term would also seem to be
quit0 dastic. It is nowh0re pointed out in the statute
what is meant by injuring. ~lust there be monetary
damages provable in order to show an injury? The
stait ute states that "actual damages" of the plaintiff
11eed not be alleged and proved. Section 13-5-14. But
must there he a certain amount of monetary damage in
order to shm\- an injuryJ How would a prospective
defornlaut know he was "injuring a competitor"? From
its mere statement and the proceeding questions, it beC'omes ob1-ious that this term is not susceptible of a.n
l'Xad definition. It will he noted from a close examination of Section 13-5-7 of the Utah Ac1t that the statute
has disjunctive phrases. It provides that a violaition will
he made out for "unfairly diYerting trade from a competitor'' and then Rt ates ''or otherwise injuring a comprtitor." 'rhe <lisjuuctive "or" as used with the word
otherwise indicaites that the "injuring a competitor"
spoken of in this sense is something different and apart
from unfairly di1-erting trade from said competitor. It
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is very difficult to e1ffision what conhl be meant hy this
last phrase. Conceivably it could mean that if a prospective defendant is selling below cost and in a barroom
one night pokes his competitor hC' has ''otherwise injured ,
the competitor.'' The absurdity of the preceding example
points out explicit!>- the n1gue11ess of the phrase'.
In support of the proposition that "a husinessmau
knows who his compe,titors are,'' intervenor-appellants
cite McElhone v. Geror, W2 N.-w. 414 (1\Iimi. 1940). The
facts of this case, as previously stated, reveal that no
evidenc-e 'diatsoever was introduced on the ques,tion of
competition. It follows, therefore, that upon introduction
of evidence it may well he shown that the term "competitor'' is vague and ambiguous and the businessmai1
does 1wt kno\Y who his competitors arc. The court in
McElhone states,
On this point the statute is definite and certain,
enough so anyivay, to fend off the presen.t attack
so far as it proceeds on the supposition that it
is otherwise. McEllwne Y. Geror, supra at 419.
The language of tl1e court is an admission that it did not
have before it the facts upon which it could determine
whether or not the statute was m1constitutional.
Intc'1Tenor-appellaut cites Borden Co. Y. Thomason,
353 S.\V. 2d 735 (l\lo. 1962) as upholding a statute
against constitutional challenge of vagueness and uncertainty. The quote set fol"th at the top of page 30 uf
inten-enor-a ppellant 's hrief supposedly upholds the
proposition. It is submitted that the words of the quote
in themselves answer the ques>tion in favor of df>fendant.
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"Whether or not a sale below cost has unfairly diverted
trade is a matter of proof in each instance and must
rlepe11d 011 the facts aiul circmnsfances shown." Borden,
supra, at 734. The milk statute involved in the Borden
case contained no criminal penalty and the court made
much of this in its discussion of Yagueness and definition
of terms. The trial court found the issues for tlw plaintiff and granted the injunction. Defendants and intern•1tors appealed. There ~was extensiYe c\·idence taken in
the case. Plaintiff presented evidence as to the vagueness, indefiniteness aml impracticability of the applica1ion of the Act and testified as to its accounting methods
::ind its allocation of costs, showing that it was impractical
if 11ot impossible to segregate its costs down to a specific
such as a bottle of milk or a carton of cottage cheese.
Plaintiff offered a witness, a11 accounting professor from
a m1iversity, who ~was qualified as an expert and stated
that th<:> cost of a half pint of milk sold to a dairy customer on a particular day simply could not be ascertained.
A witness for defendauts testified that average prices
have to be used lwcause one cannot know whether a particular amount of D base product went into certain other
productR. 'l1his is the case because there were by-products
left onr from the milk pasteurization. At page 750 the
court states:

vVe quite agr<:>e that the cost of doing business, as

mentioned in the statute, including labor costs,
salaries paid executives and officers, rent, inrter(•st, <leprecia ti on, power supplies, maintenance of
equipment, selling costs, advertising, transportation and delivery cost, credit losses and all types
of permits and license fees, all taxes, insuran.ce
and ov0rhead expenses of the processor or dis87

tributor as m:n~ionecl in Sec. 1 [ 5] ( § 416.410 [5])
cannot be cldm1tely and exactly determined upon
a day, hour or minute basis, or with reference to
a particular quart of milk delin•red ou a particular date. The statute makes no such rrq11ire111e 11 t.
Praetically all of the items mentioned in Sec.
416.410 [ 5] accrue or a re paid or the losses are
sustained over some reasonable period of time.
Some lapse of time is necessary to determi11e
thPm. Clearly arerage costs may be used in the
determinin gof the cost of any product controlled
by the statute. (Emphasis add rd.)

It is imperatin in the Borden case to note that the Agricultural Commissic.n of Missouri was empowered to make
rules and regulations govrrning this statute. It "·as
argued that all that '>ms rcquin•cl to comply ·with the
statute was a good faith attempt to allocate c@ts. But
the court states at page 752:
It is apparent we lwlieYe that to permit rosts
to be ascertained only on a "good faith'' and
reasonableness" basis u·ould leace each processor
a11d dealer to determiue his 01cn method of dctrrmining cost and the ralirlity of each method cou/r/
only be tested a11d fi11a1ly dcter1111:ned by litigatio11.
We must ancl do hold that [the stafote] is valid
and enforceable as against respondent's contentions; and that any alleged Yagueness, i11defi11iteness or difficulty in a1Jplication may be remedied
by. reasonable rules a11d regulations which the
Commissio11 ltas tlte a11tltority to adopt. (FJmphasis added.)
So it can he sern from this ease that the court realized
the' unworkableness of the trst askea for by inten-euorappellant, that of reasonableness, for reasonableness, in
e\·ery case and for every perso11, i:-; goi11g to be different.
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Tltr :::;tandard of reasonableness asked for by appellant,
1rnnl<l make the Utah Sale-Below-Cost statute equally
irnpossihle to inforce.
( C) The final term to he considered under this
poi ll t ic; the term "legal prices of a competitor" as set
forth i11 Section 13-5-12(d) of the Utah Code Annotated.

In granting an ex0mption from the Unfair Practices
for sales made in order to meet the "legal prices
of a competitor" the statute really grants nothing to a
potrntial defendant. \Vhat is meant by the term "legal"
cnnuot he deterrni11ed. ]'or example, does this term mean
leg-al as looked upon by a court, the Trade Commission,
1.l1c police, the FBI, or the potential defendant. Actually,
a legal price of a ddenclant could only be determined
after a court hearing and a court determination on the
matter. Anything short of this '''ould be speculation.
In n:quiriug a defendant to speculate as to what the
prircs of a competitor are, the statute becomes vague
nnd amhignous aml unenforceable. State ex rel. Anderson v. Flc111i11g Co., 339 P.2d 12 (Kan. 1959).
)1.ct

1 he e11forcement procedure of the Trade Commis,;io11 as tPsiifiecl to by .1\I r. Gordon Browning indicates
that thP Commission requires a retailer to determine at
ltis I>Pril whethpr a competitor, in advertising or selling
a }><1rtieular item, is advertising or selling below cost as
defined in the Act, with the intent prohibited in the Act,
SPr: (R. 123-124).
In other words, as interpreted by
tlir Trade Commission, the Act seems to require a prosprcti ,,e defendant, before he ran meet the prices of a
\'ompetitor, to determine the subjecitive intent of that
1
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competitor, siuce an illegal price requires a finding of
intent. If this be the ,-alid interpretation of this other\vise vague act, such a11 interpreitation puts an unreasonable burden upon the defendant and is ,-oid for that !
reason. See (R. 120-139.)
In the instant case, the lower court in its conclusion
2(a) held that "defendants were entitled to assume the
advertised price of Shopper's Discount for Aqua Net
Hair Spray was the legal price in the absence of actual
knowledge of an illegal sale by Shopper's Discount in
violation of the Act" (R. 46.) This is in fact the lower
com't's interpretation of what is meant by the good faitl1
meeting of the legal prices of competition exception to
the Utah statute. The lower court, in fact, concluder!
that it is good faith to meeit the advertised price of a
competitor absent any actual knowledge that the price is
not legal. This view is supported by the cases, State el'
rel. Anderson v. Commercial Cal/Illy Co., 201 P.2d 1034,
1038 (Kan. 1949). See State c:x: rel. Anderson v. Flemi11g
Co., 339 P.2d 12 (Kan. 1959). Under this interpretation,
the statute in this regard could be uphelcl as constitutional since it places no affirmativ0 lmrden upon a prospective defendant. Intervenor-app0llant cites the case
of Mcintyre v. Borofsky, 59 A.2d 471 (N.H. 1948), in
support of the proposition that defeudants do not haYe
to examine the books of a competitor. The court in tlwt
case as quoted by internnor-appcllant on page 54 of
its brief states:
"If this required the retailer to examine his
competitor's books to ~1 scertain whether the com-,
petitors [sic] price was legal, it would he of
doubtful validity.''
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\rith this defendant certainl~· agrees. Since a defendant
<'annot be validl~· required to examine his competitors'
hooks, and since aH testified by the witnesses at the trial
of this matter, no competitor will tell his competitor what
he has paid for certain items or ·whether he is selling tlw
items hC>low cost, the statute is unconstitutional if con.~trn<:•ll to so require.
In support of its proposition that the statute in
question in this case is not so vague and indefinite as
to violate' constitutional standards, intervenor-appellant
eites the [Tnited States Y. National Dairy Products Corp.,
:i12 l'.S. 29 (1963), a case upholding the Robinson-Patman Act as not vague and ambiguous in the use of the
1t>rms "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of
destroying competition or eliminating a compe,titor."
111tern•11or-appella11t iH seriously mistaken in characterizing the statute in the instant case as similar to the
Rohirnwn-Patma11 Act. First, it should be noted that
tlw Robinson-Patman Act did nothing more thm1 codify
tli0 standard of reasonableness which has been held for
yPars to be the standard in cases of due process. The
Tltnli ease sds out specific terms such as cost, cost of

doi11g l)/(siness, unfairly direrting trade from a competitor, i'llj11riilg a competitor, legal prices of a competitor,
and others. 'l'hese terms are nowhere defined and it is
ohYious from tlw evidence and findings of the court in
the instant case that there is sufficient ambiguity here
that eYen the two defendants involved in the case define
the terms differently. It should also be noted that the
Hohinso11-Patma11 Act contains no presumption such as
is contained in the Utah Act. A presumption, coupled
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with vague and ambiguous la11guage, makes a statute·
much more vulnerable Rince it shifts to the defrrn1ant
a much greater burden.
At page 50 of its brief, inkrvenor-appellant state~:
It should be noted that, contrary to the def endants' allegations, part of the clause is defined.
The word "unfair" obviously ref em back to the
terms '' ad\-ertising, offer to sell, or sale ... at
less than cost.''
Intervenor-appellants cite no authority for this ''obvious
conclusion." The statute does not specifically declare
what is unfair. The intervenor-appellant's citation to
Laitndry Operating Co. v. Spalding La1111dry & Dry
Gleaming Co., 383 S.W. 2d 364 (Ky. 1964), at page :il
does not cover this point. The quote set forth there is
not concerned with the definiteness of the Act but with
the propriety of the legislative purpose. Defendant8
are not arguing that the Legislature canuot set UJJ
standards. People v. Payless Drugs and State v. Srars
cited on page 53 for the "legal prices of competitors"
proposition have been distinguished pr(~viously on their
f a0ts.
On page 54 of its brief, intervenor-appellant cites
State v. Albertson's Inc., 412 P.2d 755 (Wash. 1966) as
being in accord with the following quote from State '·
Sears, 103 P.2d 337 (Wash. 1940):
We are, therefore, of the opinion tlmt if a merchant in good faith reduces his prices to meet
those of a competitor, who he in good faith believes has a legal price, he will not he violating
either the intent or the wording of the Act.
It should be noted that in the Albertson case, the defeml-
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ant was ai·guing that he was entitled to a presumption
that prices found on the open market were legal until
otherwise slmwn. Tlie eourt upheld this argument aud
sta te<l,

If, by the aboYe-quoted evidence, the state did

not intend to concede the legality of Albertson's
competitors' prices, it should have offered evidece to overcome the presumption that published
prices of its competitors were legal prices. State
v. Albertson's Inc., supra.
Hence the Albertson case goes much farther than the
good faith requirement. It holds exactly what defendants
luwe contenclt•d and ~what the trial court held in its condu;.:ion: that absent any knowledge of an illegal price,
tlH•re i::-; a presumptiou that published prices are legal.

In the firnt pnragraph of page 55 of its brief, interH'nor-appellant states that it disagrees with the court's
conclusion that a hsent actual knowledge there is a pre:,;umptio11 that a sale by competitor is legal, and then
~oes off 011 an argument that defendants had a duty of
nffirmati,,e action. The case previously cited by internnor-appellant, State v. Albertson's, Inc., 412 P.2d 755
(Wash. 1966) refutes its argument. That court uphold
the presumption of legality and put upon the state the
burden of rebutting such presumption. Accord, State
e.r re1. Andenwn v. Commercial Candy Co., 201P.2d1034
(Kan. 1949). 'Phe state, in the ease at bar, did not pron
that at the time they priced their hair spray defendants
knew that the price set out hy Shopper's Discount was
in fact illegal. 'l1his was the burden placed upon the
"tarte. Dutil this burden is met, according to the case
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cited by intervenor-appellant then• is no requirement
that def end ant go forward with a11ything.

POINT 8
N()T
THE COURT DID"'ERR IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIF1 F FAILED TO INTRODUCE SUFFICIENT EVID:BJNCE TO SHO-W THAT DEFENDANT GRAND CENTRAL, IN MAKING
THE SALE OF ASPIRIN, LEE'S MEN'S
PANTS AND TURKEYS INTENDED TO INDUCE THE PURCHASE OF OTHER MERCHANDISE OR 11 0 UNLAWFULLY DIVERT
TRADE FROl\I A COMPETI1'0R OR TO
OTHERWISE IN.JURE A COJ\f PETITOR
The hurclen of proof was upon the plaintiff and it
was not met. Appellant aml intcrn•nor-appellant cite:;
no part of the record to support their position.
Further, it should be pointed out that the tram;cript
of the trial at R.77 is in error i11 that the answer "Yes"
on line 1 should be ''No.'' Defemlant Grand Central has
mo'\'ed to haYe the record corrected arn1 an ord0r maki11g
the correction was signed on Fehruary 16, 1968. R.
186-188.

CONCLUSION

After an adequate hearing 011 the facts, the trial
court held the Utah Unfair Practices act to he unc011sti tutional in several respects. It is a price-fixing
statute; it m1co11stitutionally shifts the burden of proof
to a defendant; its presumptions are arbitrary and m1reasonable; its terms an~ ill c·o11ceived and ill defined,
rendering them unconstitntiminlly vag1w; its classifiea
tions arc unconstitnti01tall~- clis('riminatory; arn1 i11
practice, it is impossible to nclmi11istcr.
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\Vithout c'XC'eptio11 the cases cited by appellants
\rhich uphold similar statutes have been cases which did
not arise 011 a fully denloped set of facts, as did the
case at bar. "With the evidence before it, the trial court
con<'lmled that the Act, in its application to defendants,
coukl uot be sustained under the Utah and Federal constitutions. The holding of a trial court, based upon the
evide11ce presented, should not be overturned.
Since the time of its inception, the Utah Constitution has protected the people of this state against
immeronR attacks by persons intent upon destroying
tlw idea of free competition. The Unfair Practices Act,
promokd by and e1iacte<l through the insistence of
1wrso11s in the position similar to that of intervenorappellants, is i11imical to this traditional concept of free
l'Ompetitio11 and f"!.'ee enterprise as applied to defendants.
'l'li is Act was ill conccind and very poorly drafted. As
a result, it seriously impinges upon the rights of respond\'llts nrnl others similarly situated.
Therefore, it is submitted that the facts, as adduced
at t rinl, ancl the law, as herein before set forth, amply
support the findings of the trial court. The Utah Unfair
Practices Act is unconstitutional.
Respectfully submitted,
MULLINER, PRINCE & MANGUM
ROBERT M. YEATES
DENIS R. MORRILL
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent Grand Central
Stores, Inc., d/b/a Warshaw's
Giant Foods and Grand
Central Drugs, Inc.
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